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I. INTRODUCTION
The insurance exclusionary rule is one of the oldest enduring doctrines
in American jurisprudence.' Created by the common law nearly a century
ago, the rule has demonstrated a remarkable longevity. It still exists, in one
form or another, in nearly every state jurisdiction in this country. 2 In the
federal judicial system, the rule had long been part of the common law and
is now codified in the rules of evidence.3
The rule is simple and hardly seems menacing. Basically, it provides
that evidence that a party is or is not insured may not be admitted to prove
that party's negligence. 4 Stated differently, it precludes any reference to the
topic of "insurance" that is intended solely to divulge the existence of a
party's insurance coverage. 5 The rule's expressed purpose, in turn, appears
* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. The
author wishes to thank his research assistant, Joseph Agliozzo, whose contributions to
this project have been invaluable. Financial support for this article was provided by a
Southwestern University summer research grant.
I The history of the rule is recounted in Part HI, section A of this Article. See
infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
2 See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5361, at 426-27 (1980); see generally Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence, and
Propriety and Effect of Questions, Statements, Comments, etc., Tending to Show that
Defendant in Personal Injury or Death Action Carries Liability Insurance, 4 A.L.R.2d
761 (1949) (and later case service; collecting cases).
3 The insurance exclusionary rule was codified in Rule 411 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence in 1975. FED. R. EvID. 411. It was patterned after Rule 310 of the Model
Code of Evidence, which had restated the common law. 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5361, at 425. Rule 411 is discussed in more detail infra
notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
4 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 201, at 593 (3d ed. 1984).
5 See Ratner, Insurance: 7he Forbidden Word, 3 U. KAN. L. REV. 328, 328
(1955). The court in one early case explained:
While courts have condemned repeatedly attempts to bring before a jury the fact
that insurance exists, their condemnation extends only to cases where there is an
"avowed purpose and successful attempt" to bring the fact before the jury. It does
not extend to cases where the information comes in incidentally in attempting to
prove other facts, or where the record does not show that the particular answer
was sought or anticipated.
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more benevolent than harmful. It seeks to ensure that juries base their
verdicts upon legitimate grounds and not upon the improper notion that a
judgment adverse to the defendant will be passed along to a "deep pocket"
insurance company. 6
Despite these appearances, however, many within the legal community
have said that the rule does far more harm than good, and these critics
have been vociferous to say the least. 7 Indeed, few doctrines in the law
have been subject to the type of vituperation heaped upon the insurance
exclusionary rule.8 Its epithets have ranged from "impracticable" 9 to a
"hollow shell"10 and an "archaic legal principle"11 that has led courts to
"coddle" 12 insurance companies and "indulge in a lot of nonsense." 13
Hughes v. Quakenbush, 1 Cal. App. 2d 349, 358, 37 P.2d 99, 103 (1934).
6 See Note, Evidence: Revealing the Existence of Defendant's Liability Insurance
to the Jury, 6 CUMB. L. REV. 123, 124 (1975).
7 This contempt has been shared by a significant segment of the legal
intelligentsia, including judges. See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir.
1965); Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 330 P.2d 468 (1958); Schwarzer,
Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, reprinted in 132 F.R.D. 575,
586-88 (1990) (written by a federal district judge in the Northern District of
California). This contempt is also shared by some academicians. See 2 D. LOUISELL
& C. MEULLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 193 (1978); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, §
201; 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, § 10.05(e) (6th ed. 1988); 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 282a (3d ed. 1940); 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 2, §§ 5361-69; Fannin, Disclosure of Insurance in Negligence Trials-77te
Arizona Rule, 5 ARIZ. L. REV. 83 (1963); Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L.
REV. 157 (1954); Ratner, supra note 5; Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 U. KAN. L.
REV. 675 (1957); Note, supra note 6.
8 One commentator has opined that the rule has been inundated by an "avalanche
of authoritative criticism." Slough, supra note 7, at 711. The ruminations of another
illustrate the disdain for the rule:
Probably no other step in Texas trial procedure would abolish so many
useless annoyances, so many hazards of mistrial, so much expense and so much
injustice as would the simple amendment of the rules which prohibit the joinder of
the insurer with the insured in negligence cases. Probably also there is no single
step that would at the same time restore more integrity to jury trial in personal
injury litigation.
Green, supra note 7, at 159-60 (footnotes omitted).
9 2 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 282a, at 148.
10 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 597.
11 Slough, supra note 7, at 713.
12 Allen, Why Do Courts Coddle Automobile Indemnity Companies?, 61 AMER.
L. REV. 77 (1927), cited in 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5362, at
428 n. 10.
13 1 MORGAN, supra note 7, at 254.
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Because of its older vintage, the rule has been viewed as an
anachronism. Critics of the rule contend that savvy jurors in modern civil
actions no longer need the protection it once afforded. Unlike their
nineteenth-century counterparts, today's juries supposedly are not
influenced by insurance references because they are already aware of the
prevalence of insurance in such litigation and may actually presume its
existence. 14 Even if this were not so, the rule's detractors assert, the rule is
not worth the cost of implementing it. As one treatise writer has stated,
"[ilts costs include extensive and unnecessary arguments, reversals, and
retrials stemming from elusive questions of prejudice and good faith."15
Until recently, this polemic about the viability of the rule has been
largely an academic one. Neither the rule nor its criticisms had ever been
supported by empirical research. 16 In recent years, however, significant
effort has been expended by scholars within the legal and behavioral
science fields to discover more about jury dynamics, biases, and
behavior.17 Out of this movement have come studies that shed considerable
14 These arguments are reviewed in depth infra notes 75-83 and accompanying
text.
15 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 597. A more expansive discussion of
this criticism appears infra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
16 Indeed, each side of the debate has criticized the position of the other for
failing to provide such verification. One critic of the rule commented: "So far as I
have been able to discover the first ground [supporting the rule, i.e., that juries aware
of the existence of insurance are more likely to find for the plaintiff] is established by
nothing more than 'judicial knowledge.'" Green, supra note 7, at 160. Defending the
rule, an advocate countered:
He [Professor Green] suggests ... that since this assumption is not subject to
verification it is not necessarily true, and he cites a case in which a lower verdict
was returned on the first trial, when the fact of insurance was before the jury, than
on a second trial where evidence of this fact was excluded. There are doubtless
other similar instances but they prove nothing.
Gay, "Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View, 34 TEX. L. REV. 368, 372 (1956)
(footnotes omitted).
17 See, e.g., J. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY (1987);
J. GOBERT & W. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION (2d ed. 1990); J. GUINTHER, THE JURY
IN AMERICA xvii (1988). During the 1970s, "160 studies of this kind were published,
many by law professors, but also by psychologists, sociologists, and other students of
the behavioral sciences. . . ." Id. An earlier commentator had reported the existence
of over 300 such studies prior to 1955. Id. (citing W. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 42 (1984)); S. HAMLIN, WHAT MAKES JURIES LISTEN (1985); V.
HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986); R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N.
PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983) [hereinafter HASTIE STUDY]; H. KALVEN &
H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); S. KASSIN & L. WRGHTSMAN, THE
AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL (1988); Kessler, The Social Psychology of Jury
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light on the validity of the rule and its criticisms.18 Ultimately such studies
may help to determine the fate of the rule; in the meantime, at least, they
certainly justify its re-examination.
This Article is dedicated to that purpose. Part II reviews the historical
foundations of the rule and how it has come to be applied both during trial
and voir dire.19 In Part I, this Article will review in depth the criticisms
levied against the insurance exclusionary rule-both in terms of its
substantive merit, and the procedural and practical difficulties in its
implementation. 20 Relying on recent studies on jury behavior, Part IV re-
examines the substantive criticisms of the rule.21 These results appear both
to legitimate the rule and to undermine its criticisms. Thus, in Part V, this
Article will propose an approach that retains the rule, while alleviating
much of the impracticality in implementing it at each stage of litigation. 22
Finally, Part VI concludes with three suggested post-trial techniques that,
by affording greater insight into the deliberative process of juries, may
reduce if not eliminate altogether the need for the insurance exclusionary
rule.23
II. THE HISTORY OF THE INSURANCE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN MODERN LITIGATION
A. Origin of the Rule
The insurance exclusionary rule developed during the late nineteenth
century in the wake of the industrial revolution. With the advent of
assembly-line production, businesses were able to employ more workers
and produce more products. As a result, a greater number of consumers
and workers suffered injuries at the hands of new industrial products and
machinery. 24 Estranged by the impersonal nature of the corporate entities
Deliberations, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 69 (R. Simon ed. 1975) [hereinafter
Kessler, Social Psychology]; R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1986); L.
SMITH & L. MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES (1985); V.
STARR & M. MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION (1985); Stephan, Selective
Characteristics of Jurors and Litigants: Their Influences On Juries' Verdicts, in THE
JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 97 (R. Simon ed. 1975) [hereinafter Stephan Study]; D.
VINSON, JURY TRIALS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A WINNING STRATEGY (1986).
18 Much of Part IV of this Article is devoted to an examination of these studies.
See infra notes 117, 167 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 24-72 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 73-116 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 117-82 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 183-239 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 240-307 and accompanying text.24 K. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 123 (1989).
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producing this havoc, and embittered by their seeming disregard for its
consequences, American society increasingly took to the courts to vent its
frustration.25
An insurance explosion followed from the upswing in litigation. 26
Until the latter half of the 1800s, insurance was limited primarily to
commercial enterprises. Late nineteenth-century employers, however,
began to purchase liability insurance to protect themselves against
employees asserting work related injuries. 27 When workers' compensation
eliminated this market, insurers began to diversify types of liability
coverage, extending it beyond commercial ventures to more personal
subject matters. 28 By the 1940s, liability insurance had become a
permanent feqture of American culture, providing protection "for the
everyday hurts inflicted by the multitudinous activities of our society."29
By contract, carriers that provided such insurance were required to
conduct the investigation of the claims asserted, and to prepare, plan, and
pay for the defense of the insured-defendants. 30 Thus, when injured
plaintiffs instituted litigation, they were not just suing the defendants
whose negligence had allegedly caused their injuries, often they also were
fighting the defendants' insurers that had refused to pay their claims.
At the inception of the litigation boom, lawsuits against insured
defendants were so infrequent and the availability of insurance coverage so
limited that it was believed few jurors would be likely to consider whether
the defendant was insured. 31 Thus, any mention of insurance during the
litigation was assumed to highlight for the jury that the defendant would
not have to pay the judgment, but would pass the loss on to a financially
stable liability insurer.32 Given the growing hostility toward these "deep
pocket" businesses, it was assumed that jurors so indoctrinated would be
more likely to impose liability against defendants, and their insurers, and
would award higher damages when they did.33 It was upon these two
assumptions- of indoctrination and prejudicial impact to the defendant-
that the insurance exclusionary rule was created.
25 See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-10 (1973).
26 See K. HALL, supra note 24, at 297; G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA
146-50 (1980).
27 K. HALL, supra note 24, at 297; G.E. WHITE, supra note 26, at 147.
28 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS 585 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]; K. HALL, supra note 24, at 297.
29 Id. (quoting G.E. WHITE, supra note 26, at 150).
30 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 584-85.
31 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 596; Slough, supra note 7, at 710-
11.
32 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 590.
33 See Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 275-76, 330 P.2d 468, 472
(1958) (quoting 10 Cal. Jur. § 29.1, at 629 (10-yr. Supp.)).
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B. Operation of the Rule
The insurance exclusionary doctrine has been applied primarily during
trial as a rule of evidence. 34 Yet it has also been employed during voir
dire,35 before trial has commenced. This may appear odd at first glance,
since no "evidence" is formally presented to the jury at this preliminary
stage of the litigation. Nevertheless, like the presentation of evidence, the
process of voir dire tends to color the predominantly clean slate of
judgment that the jurors presumably bring to the jury box. 36 Indeed,
although voir dire is designed to aid counsel in weeding out biased
individuals, many attorneys use it to introduce the jury to the parties and
the facts involved in the case. 37 Thus, both trial and voir dire seem
34 Indeed, in this context, most jurisdictions have reduced the doctrine to a statute
or a rule of court, see 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5361, at 426-27
& nan.11-16, whereas, when applied outside of trial proceedings, the rule remains a
product of the common law.
35 Voir dire is a pretrial proceeding in which a series of questions are posed to
prospective jurors by either the attorneys, the judge, or both. V. STARR & M.
MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 2.1.10, at 39, § 9.0, at 241. It provides the parties
with an opportunity to discover biases of the prospective jurors and obtain background
information that bears on their qualifications. Id. § 8.1, at 224.
36 Voir dire has been identified as the first stage of impression formation for
prospective jurors. L. SMrrH & L. MALANDRO, supra note 17, § 1.05, at 13, § 1.51,
at 92. One recent study suggests that 15% of all jurors may form a predisposition in
favor of or against one of the parties after voir dire. J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at
309 (results obtained from jurors who served in federal court; responses to question
no. 3). Another survey estimates that as many as 75% of jurors develop "a definite
opinion about the case by the end of voir dire." V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, supra
note 17, § 8.0, at 224.
37 Lawyers often use voir dire for many or all of the following purposes:
1) to move the jury as a group;
2) to discover prejudice;
3) to eliminate extreme positions;
4) to discover "friendly"jurors;
5) to exercise "educated" peremptories;
6) to cause jurors to face their own prejudices;
7) to teach jurors important facts in the case;
8) to expose jurors to damaging facts in the case;
9) to teach jurors the law of the case;
10) to develop personal relationships between lawyer and juror;
11) to expose opposing counsel;
12) to prepare for summation.
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responsible, admittedly to varying degrees, for molding the mind set of the
jury. Because this molding process could, and often does, include
indoctrinating the jurors to the existence of insurance in the case, the
exclusionary rule has found a home in both contexts.
1. Voir Dire
In voir dire, a panel of prospective jurors, known as the venire, are
asked by the court or by counsel to respond in person to questions
concerning their backgrounds and experiences. Often, plaintiff's counsel
will seek to ask the panel whether they possess any past or present
connections to the insurance industry. This is when the exclusionary rule
comes into play. At this point, defense counsel may invoke the rule to
prohibit any such reference to insurance during questioning. The court that
must determine the propriety of such an inquiry is then left with a
dilemma.
On one hand, it seems that the plaintiff's attorney should be entitled to
such information so he or she can make intelligent use of peremptory
challenges"8 and challenges for cause.39 Jurors who have had at least
A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS §§ 7.13-.24, at 280-87 (1977)
(quoted as reprinted in S. KAssN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 17, at 50); see V.
STARR & M. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 8.1.1-.8, at 224-33 (functions of voir
dire include relaxing jurors, establishing credibility, conditioning jurors to accept the
law, educating them about the particular case, avoiding situations that might result in
mistrial, nominating the foreperson, and laying a foundation for the opening statement
and closing argument). Kassin and Wrightsman point out that only three of these
purposes (numbers 2, 3, and 5) are legally sanctioned objectives of voir dire. S.
KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 17, at 50-52. One study suggests that
attorneys spend between 40% and 80% of their time during voir dire attempting to
indoctrinate jurors to their view of the case. J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 50-51.
38 Peremptory challenges are used by counsel to remove from the venire those
persons who they suspect would not be sympathetic to their clients' cases. See J. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 146 (1977). In exercising peremptory
challenges, counsel need not state the reason for requesting that the challenged venire
member be excused. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled in
part on other grounds, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, supra note
17, § 2.1.12, at 44. Under federal practice, counsel in civil actions are entitled to
three peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982); see FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
39 Unlike peremptory challenges, challenges for cause may only be exercised if
accompanied by a valid reason for the challenged juror's discharge. V. STARR & M.
MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 2.1.11, at 43. One such reason is the detection of bias
which would impair the juror's ability to decide the facts impartially. Id. Typical
sources of bias which would sustain a challenge for cause include a juror's relation to
or acquaintance with the parties, attorneys or witnesses involved in the subject case. J.
GOBERT & W. JORDAN, supra note 17, §§ 7.03, 7.04. In federal civil actions, the
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modest exposure to the insurance industry have been deemed irrevocably
biased against plaintiffs who invoked the judicial process to settle disputes,
many of which directly or indirectly involved insurance companies. 40
Accordingly, there seems to be a need to explore the background of each
prospective juror for such a connection. Arguably at least, questions that
probe the panel for this information are not only relevant to detecting this
bias, but also reasonably effective in doing so.41
On the other hand, counsel for the defense should have the right to
ensure that the prospective jurors are not unduly influenced in the
attorneys are permitted an unlimited number of challenges for cause. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1870 (1982).
40 In conducting voir dire, attorneys have long stereotyped venire members as
"pro-plaintiff" or "pro-defendant" depending upon their occupation. See Hermann,
Occupations of Jurors as an Influence on Their Verdict, 5 FORUM 150, 150 (1970).
While these stereotypes were often based on nothing more than instinct or folklore, J.
GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 91, there is now substantial empirical evidence that
indicates that occupational status is a significant source of bias in jurors. Broeder,
Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1079 (1965); Hermann, supra at 150; Stephan Study, supra note 17,
at 114. But see J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 91. More specifically, studies have
confirmed that insurance company employees do tend to favor defendants in civil
actions. See L. SMITH & L. MALANDRO, supra note 17, § 6A.10, at 105 (Supp. 1988)
(citing Adkins, Jury Selection: An Art? A Science? Or Luck?, TRIAL, Dec.-Jan. 1968-
69, at 37-39; Katz, The Twelve Man Jury, TRIAL, Dec.-Jan. 1968-69, at 39-42).
These findings are not surprising, for the desire to attack or protect members of
certain groups has been identified as a compelling underlying motive influencing juror
verdict preferences. HASTIE STUDY, supra note 17, at 172-73.
41 The efficacy of voir dire in ferreting out bias has been questioned. One author
opined that "[vloir dire [is] grossly ineffective not only in weeding out 'unfavorable'
jurors but even in eliciting the data which would have shown particular jurors as very
likely to prove 'unfavorable.'"Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study,
38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 505 (1965); see also S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra
note 17, at 49-56. For this reason, voir dire has been eliminated as a means of jury
selection in England. See W. CORNISH, THE JURY 46 (1968); 26 L. HAILsHAM,
HALSBURY'S LAW OF ENGLAND 628 (4th ed. 1979). Nevertheless, many
commentators still contend that voir dire is often the main factor in winning or losing
cases and should be given "a first priority in importance." L. SMITH & L.
MALANDRO, supra note 17, § 6A.01, at 72 (Supp. 1988) (chapter authored by Ronald
J. Matlon) (citing A. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY 1 (Court Practice Institute 1979));
see also Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict:
An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to resolve this dispute. Suffice it
to say that, for whatever its drawbacks, voir dire currently is the most commonly
employed method for evaluating the qualifications of prospective jurors. Thus, it is the
most likely avenue through which the concept of insurance might first be introduced to
the venire.
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plaintiff's favor by the mention of insurance.42 Jurors who have been
introduced to the existence of insurance during voir dire seem just as likely
to be distracted from the key issues of liability as those who hear an
improper reference to insurance during trial. 43 Regardless of the procedural
context in which such indoctrination occurs, the prospect of a resulting bias
in favor of the plaintiff may still exist. Thus, the prejudice to the defendant
may be equally costly.
In most jurisdictions, courts are afforded discretion in determining the
manner in which voir dire will be conducted and the scope of the questions
posed. 44 The court's discretion in this regard is usually quite broad, and
will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless clearly abused.45 The
"good faith" standard is by far the one most commonly employed by courts
to assist in the exercise of that discretion. 46 Under this standard, the court
will permit insurance questions during voir dire if they are presented in
good faith by the proponent.47
The simplicity of this standard has made its interpretation most
difficult. Although courts agree that good faith is not demonstrated when
the insurance questions are posed solely for the purpose of introducing the
fact of insurance coverage to the venire,48 they have had much less success
in clarifying what good faith is. No definition has ever been ascribed to the
term in this context.49 The apparent reason for this ambiguity is that the
standard is inherently subjective, focusing upon the hidden motivation of
counsel in proposing the inquiry.50 To alleviate the difficulty of
discovering this motivation, courts have relied on more objective criteria to
establish good faith.
42 Whether insurance references indoctrinate jurors to assume that defendants are
insured is explored infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
43 The effect which such references have upon the decisionmaking process of
juries is examined infra notes 134-67 and accompanying text.
44 See Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Federal Court's Refusal on
Voir Dire in Civil Action to Ask or Permit Questions Submitted by Counsel, 72 A.L.R.
FED. 638, 649-52 (1985) (collecting federal cases).
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Eisenhauer v. Burger, 431 F.2d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying
Ohio law); Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Taylor, 388 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1967);
Lentner v. Lieberstein, 279 F.2d 385, 387 (7th Cir. 1960) (applying Illinois law);
Duff v. Page, 249 F.2d 137, 139 (9th Cir. 1957); Braman v. Wiley, 119 F.2d 991,
993 (7th Cir. 1941) (applying Indiana law); Bass v. Deher, 103 F.2d 28, 36 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 580 (1939). For a survey of both state and federal
jurisdictions using the good faith standard, see Annotation, supra note 2, § 16 (and
later case service). Federal cases are also collected in Annotation, supra note 44, § 7.
47 See Duff, 249 F.2d at 139; Bass, 103 F.2d at 36.
48 See Duff, 249 F.2d at 139; Bass, 103 F.2d at 36.
49 Slough, supra note 7, at 715.
50 Id. at 716.
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The need for such questioning has been the most compelling objective
determinant of good faith. Necessity, in this sense, has depended upon a
variety of factors under the circumstances of each particular case.51
Nevertheless, the deciding factor in the majority of cases has been the mere
existence of insurance coverage by the defendant. 52 When no insurance
coverage has been adduced, courts have routinely upheld the denial of this
inquiry53 and reversed its admission.54 Conversely, when proof of
insurance was provided, admission of insurance questions has been
approved. 55
2. Trial
While the application of the exclusionary rule during voir dire has
remained a part of the common law, the standards for applying the rule at
trial generally have not. They have become embodied in statutes or
procedural rules patterned after Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 56 Codifying the common law, the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence included in Rule 411 the exclusionary principles regarding
insurance.57 Rule 411 provides that "[e]vidence that a person was or was
not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he
51 There are four important considerations. First, the probability that the question
would overemphasize the existence of insurance in the case. See, e.g., Hallberg v.
Brasher, 679 F.2d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 1982); Peterson v. Auto Wash Mfg. & Supply
Co., 676 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1982). Second, the probability that the same
information may have been elicited through other voir dire questions. See infra notes
186-89. Third, the use of an appropriate admonition by the trial judge that jurors
volunteer information which might affect their neutrality. See Parento v. Palumbo,
677 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1982). Fourth, the degree to which an insurer is actually
interested in the case. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Williams, 370 F.2d
839, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1966) (insurance company only a subrogee).
52 See generally Annotation, supra note 2, § 16, at 792-802 (collecting state
cases).
53 See Hallberg, 679 F.2d at 754; Parento, 677 F.2d at 5; Peterson, 676 F.2d at
953; Labbee v. Roadway Express, Inc., 469 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1972); Hinkle v.
Hampton, 388 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1968); Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc., 375
F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1968); Louisville & Nashville R.R., 370 F.2d at 842; Lentner, 279
F.2d at 387; Duff, 249 F.2d at 140; Smedra v. Stanek, 187 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1951).
54 See Socony Mobil Oil Co., 388 F.2d at 586.
55 See Wichmann v. United Disposal, Inc., 553 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (8th Cir.
1977).
56 For a list of state jurisdictions that have adopted Rule 411 in toto, in part, or
with modifications, see 2 D. LOUIsELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 192, at 575-
76 & nn.5-9 (collecting rules and statutes).
57 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5361, at 425-26.
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acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully." 58 Like the common-law
doctrine, Rule 411 is premised on the notion that the prejudicial
indoctrinating effects of such evidence outweigh its relevance to the
substantive issue of fault.59 As the Advisory Committee Notes attest:
The courts have with substantial unanimity rejected evidence of liability
insurance for the purpose of proving fault, and the absence of liability
insurance as proof of lack of fault. At best the inference of fault from the
fact of insurance coverage is a tenuous one, as is its converse. More
important, no doubt, has been the feeling that knowledge of the presence
or absence of liability insurance would induce juries to decide cases on
improper grounds. 60
Nevertheless, Rule 411 does not preclude the use of "insurance
evidence" when it is used for a purpose other than to demonstrate the
degree of care exercised by the defendant. Specifically, it allows evidence
of insurance coverage to be admitted during trial as "proof of agency,
ownership, or control," or to establish the "bias or prejudice of a
witness. "61
Since the rule's adoption, a number of other exceptions have been
added to the rule of exclusion. 62 For example, admissions by a party either
before or after an accident have been allowed as evidence even though the
declarant referred to the existence or nonexistence of insurance coverage. 63
Also, documents that include a reference to insurance have been
permitted. 64 Some courts have allowed the defendant to prove a lack of
insurance when other evidence may have suggested its existence. 65 Finally,
though technically not a recognized exception, witnesses and counsel
occasionally will make errant references to insurance during trial. 66
Though such references lack the blessing of the court, they nevertheless are
"admitted" because they are heard by the jury before an appropriate
objection can be raised.
Although these exceptions permit the introduction of insurance
evidence for the specified purposes, they do not require it. For such
58 FED. R. EvID. 411.
59 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 593-94.
60 FED. R. EvID. 411 advisory committee's note.
61 FED. R. EvID. 411.
62 See 2 D. LoUISELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 194; 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5368; Slough, supra note 7, at 713-16.
63 See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5368, at 465-70.
64 Id. at 467-68.
65 This is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "curative admissibility." Id. at
470-71.
66 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 595-96.
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evidence to gain admission during trial, its relevance still must outweigh
the possibility that it will distract the jury from the real issues in the
case.
67
As in voir dire, courts assessing the admissibility of insurance evidence
at trial routinely focus on the motive of counsel in seeking to inject the fact
of insurance into the case. Invariably, when counsel fails to demonstrate a
"good faith" purpose for pursuing the insurance issue, courts are inclined
to refuse this line of questioning. 68 As in voir dire, good faith in this
context also depends largely upon the circumstances surrounding the
request. The decisive factors usually include the presumed knowledge of
the jurors regarding insurance, 69 the frequency and specificity of the
references, 70 the relative need for their inclusion,71 and the ability to avoid
them.72
III. TRADITIONAL CRITICISMS OF THE INSURANCE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
For many years now, the insurance exclusionary rule has been the
subject of criticism and contempt by courts and scholars, many of whom
have called for its abandonment. 73 Though of varying degrees of
complexity, these criticisms can be grouped into two general categories-
one questioning the substantive merit of the rule, the other focusing on its
procedural inadequacies. To understand the source and scope of this
discontent, each of these categories is discussed in depth below.
A. Substantive Criticisms
The substantive criticisms refute the dual interrelated notions
underlying the exclusionary rule. Contrary to the notion that insurance
references promote jury indoctrination, critics assert that such references in
fact have no impact upon the decisions of juries because most jurors these
days already presume that defendants carry liability coverage. Any
67 See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5365, at 455.
68 See id. § 5369, at 474.
69 See Annotation, Admissibility, After Enactment of Rule 411, Federal Rules of
Evidence, of Evidence of Liability Insurance in Negligence Actions, 40 A.L.R. FED.
541, 568-69 § 20 (1978).
70 See id. § 21, at 569.
71 In other words, it must appear that their probative value outweighs their
prejudicial impact. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 594.
72 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5369, at 474; see also 2 D.
LOUIsELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 193, at 581.
73 See supra note 7.
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indoctrinating effect which might result, they maintain, can be eliminated
by appropriate cautionary instructions by the court. Whatever the extent of
this indoctrination, detractors of the rule also challenge the premise that its
role in the decisionmaking process of the jury is improper. They contend
that jurors are entitled to know whether an insurance company is a real
party in interest, and so should be freely informed of this fact.74
1. The View that Insurance References Do Not Promote
Indoctrination, or May Be Inhibited from Doing So
by Cautionary Instructions
As the critics point out, the exclusionary rule was a product of its
times. Originating at the turn of the century, it rested on the belief that
most jurors were then unaware of the role of insurance in civil litigation.75
Since early in the twentieth century, however, critics of the rule have
questioned the continued validity of this assumption. 76
During this century, the argument goes, the lives of few individuals
have remained untouched by some form of insurance. Many states have
compulsory auto insurance laws that require all individuals owning a
vehicle to carry liability insurance. 77  Many homeowners carry
homeowner's insurance to protect against injuries that may occur in or
around their dwellings. 78 Even those individuals who do not own insurance
are said to be aware of the insurance crises that have garnered so much
publicity in the last thirty years. 79 For several years, the premiums for
manufacturers who engage in risky enterprises have soared because of the
number and size of verdicts rendered against them.80 Physicians also have
decried the increased volume of medical malpractice lawsuits and the
subsequent effect upon the expense of medical malpractice insurance. 81
74 A concise summary of all the major criticisms is contained in Comment,
Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L.
REV. 167, 193 (1969).
75 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
76 One of the first articles to criticize the rule was published in 1927. See Allen,
supra note 12.
77 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 596; Fannin, supra note 7, at 92 (1963);
Green, supra note 7, at 166; Slough, supra note 7, at 710-11.
78 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 596.
79 Green, supra note 7, at 166.
80 W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
696 (8th ed. 1988).
81 See PROSSER, supra note 28, § 32, at 192-93.
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Many insurers, in fact, have initiated advertising campaigns designed to
educate the public of the consequences of such awards.82
Against this background, legal commentators have suggested that most
jurors today presume the existence of insurance in civil cases and
understand its role in litigation.8 3 This conclusion, if true, would
undermine the first major assumption underlying the exclusionary rule-
that references to insurance indoctrinate in the jury the belief that the
defendant is insured. If the jurors bring this belief with them to the jury
box, then there is little need, the rule's detractors assert, to be concerned
with the indoctrinating effects of insurance evidence.
Even if the fact of insurance could be overemphasized, critics dispute
the contention that this necessarily would have an impact upon the jury.
They argue that even excessive references to insurance can be tempered
with a cautionary instruction from the judge admonishing the jury to
disregard the references and to base its determination solely upon the
permissible evidence. 84 'Such an instruction presumably will ensure that the
existence of insurance will play no role in the jury's finding of liability or
award of damages. With the aid of this prophylactic measure, critics
believe, there no longer is a need to insulate the jury from insurance
references through use of a doctrinal rule of exclusion. 85
Such an approach has been adopted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Kiernan v. Van Schaik,86 the court held
that, during voir dire, if plaintiff's counsel requests to interrogate the
prospective jurors concerning their connections with the liability insurance
industry, the district court must permit this line of questioning. 87 In
adopting this rule of automatic inclusion, the court indicated that "[j]urors
are not unaware that insurance is at large in the world and its mention will
82 2 D. LOUIsELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 193, at 579; Fannin, supra
note 7, at 92. In the 1950s, and again in the 1970s, various insurance companies
initiated an advertising campaign designed to inform the public that exceedingly
generous civil verdicts are not absorbed exclusively by insurers, but are passed along
to the consuming public through higher insurance premiums. See J. GOBERT & W.
JORDAN, supra note 17, § 7.34, at 238.
83 See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 193, at 579; C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 596; Fannin, supra note 7, at 92; Green, supra
note 7, at 166; Ratner, supra note 5, at 332; Slough, supra note 7, at 710-11;
Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 586-87; Note, supra note 6, at 137.
84 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 596; Green, supra note 7, at 164
n.22.
85 Green, supra note 7, at 164.
86 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
87 Id. at 782.
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not open to them a previously unknown realm."88 Based on this
assumption, the court concluded:
It is in fact more realistic for the judge to dissolve the phantom [of
insurance] by open talk in the courtroom than to have it run loose in the
unconfined speculations of the jury room. The court has wide control
over the voir dire and can adequately safeguard the inquiry by explaining
to the jurors the limited scope and purpose of the examination and thus
eliminate any implication of the existence or relevance of insurance in
the case before it.
. . . An adequate caution should be given by the court to make it
clear to the jury that these questions do not imply either that any
defendant is insured or that the matter of insurance or lack of insurance
is to be considered in reaching a verdict. 89
Although the Kiernan decision has not been followed by any other
federal jurisdiction, neither has it been overturned by the Third Circuit. In
fact, it recently has been reaffirmed. 90 Accordingly, it remains a persuasive
testament to the continued vitality of the school critical to the exclusionary
rule and to the rule's possible substantive weaknesses.
2. The View That It Is Improper To Exclude Insurance Evidence
In addition to assailing the indoctrinating effects of insurance
references, critics have refuted the rule's second major assumption-that it
is improper for juries so indoctrinated to consider the existence of
insurance coverage in civil cases. Though, as will be discussed below,
these criticisms proceed from a number of different perspectives, they
share a couple of common bonds. Each finds such revelations to be
important, relevant subjects for the jury's consideration, and so denies any
prejudicial effect from their admission. Perhaps more importantly, each
presupposes from such forthright disclosures greater fairness to the jurors,
the parties, and the system itself.
A few critics have argued that the defendant's procurement of
insurance may indicate a subsequent willingness to engage in negligent
behavior. 91 In this way, they suggest, evidence of insurance coverage is
relevant to the basic issue of negligence that permeates most civil
litigation. 92 Wright and Graham, in their multivolume treatise on the
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See Horsey v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 882 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1989).
91 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5362, at 431; Green, supra
note 7, at 161-62.
92 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5362, at 431.
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Federal Rules of Evidence, have supported this view with the following
illustration:
It certainly does not seem implausible to suggest that the decision of
whether to leave one's fireside to remove ice from the front walk on a
winter day in South Dakota might be influenced by the presence or
absence of personal liability to strangers who might fall. Certainly the
inference is strong enough to satisfy the minimal standard of relevance
established by [Federal Rules of] Evidence Rule 401. 93
Other detractors of the exclusionary rule have found insurance
disclosure indispensable in more fairly apportioning the loss between the
parties. 94 As Professor Leon Green, one of the rule's chief critics, has put
it:
On the issue of damages the ability to pay is a highly significant fact,
as it is in all affairs of life. Even in the support of churches, local, state
and national governments, and other institutions, ability to pay is of the
greatest importance. Lawyers, doctors, engineers and others who render
professional services take into account the economic status of a client,
patient or other patron. If an adequate recovery for the plaintiff in a
personal injury case would wipe the defendant out financially, can it be
said that this fact is not relevant? Why should an insurance carrier get
the benefit of the jury's thinking the defendant is unable to pay at all or
to pay full damages? Why should a plaintiff in such a case be denied his
full remedy if the insured has paid for protection against his
negligence[?] 95
Finally, a similar, though more oblique, attack upon the rule's
exclusionary principle has gained considerable support. It springs from the
idea that "[t]he identities of the parties and their interests in litigation are
as fundamental to the trial process of the common law, whether by judge
or jury, as are any of its other basic principles." 96 By hiding the existence
of insurance, critics lament, the exclusionary rule threatens to subvert this
process in two material respects. On one hand, by concealing the identity
of insurers as "real parties in interest," the jury is deprived valuable
information, including "how witnesses came to be aligned[,] what
advantages of litigation are enjoyed by the parties[,] and who is able to
93 See id.
94 Id. § 5362, at 432-33; Fannin, supra note 7, at 93.
95 Green, supra note 7, at 162-63.
96 Id. at 161.
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bear the risk and who is not." 97 On the other hand, because the "deep
pocket" appearance of defendants tends to be used adversely against them
by jurors, insurers whose identities are protected by the rule enjoy an
unfair advantage in litigation not shared by other real parties in interest
whose identities as defendants remain conspicuous. 98 Summarizing this
view in rather laconic fashion, Wright and Graham have opined:
The need for a rule dealing with the admissibility of evidence of
insurance arises because the insurance company is permitted to litigate
disguised as its insured....
Seen from this vantage point, the issue under [the exclusionary rule]
is not the relevance of insurance as evidence of fault but rather how far
fact-finding is to be distorted in order to permit insurance companies to
remain disguised. If the fear of juror prejudice is sufficient to allow an
insurance company to masquerade as the Salvation Army, why should
not a black litigant be permitted to hire a white to impersonate him at the
counsel table and from the witness stand in order to avoid the well-
known impact of racism on personal injury awards? 99
B. Procedural Criticisms
Perhaps even more scathing criticism of the rule has focused on the
impracticality of its implementation during pretrial and trial
proceedings.l10 These criticisms have generally fallen into three categories.
The first major criticism is that the standards used to apply the rule are
too subjective and thus provide no meaningful guidance to a court in
deciding whether to allow the reference. As noted above, the "good faith"
standard has been employed by courts to implement the rule both during
voir dire and trial. 10 1 This test requires the court to delve into the mind of
the proponent of the insurance reference to determine whether she has good
reason for doing so. The most obvious problem with such a standard is that
it is almost impossible to determine clearly the subjective motivation
97 Id. at 162; see also 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 193, at
578; Fannin, supra note 7, at 93; Ratner, supra note 5, at 332.
98 See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 193, at 578-79; 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5362, at 433; Wilson, Evidence of Liability
Insurance in Texas, 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1949).
99 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5362, at 434-35; see also
Green, supra note 7, at 162-63.
100 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 597-98; C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5362, at 435-36; Fannin, supra note 7, at 93; Green, supra
note 7, at 167; Slough, supra note 7, at 712-13.
101 See supra notes 46 & 68 and accompanying text.
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behind such a request. 10 2 Only the proponent can be sure of subjective
intent, and she is unlikely to admit bad faith in seeking to introduce the
fact of insurance into the case. This is especially true when an insurance
question is posed during voir dire, since the proponent may usually
reasonably contend that she is entitled to know whether the attitudes of the
venire towards the insurance industry would affect their ability to decide
the case impartially. 0 3 It is also true during trial, however, when the
102 See Slough, supra note 7, at 715.
103 One federal jurisdiction even requires the admission of insurance questions
when requested, holding that they are necessary to the exercise of peremptory
challenges. See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965). In Kiernan, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals read the seventh amendment's guarantee of civil jury
trials in conjunction with the fifth amendment's due process guarantee and concluded
that the right to an impartial jury in a civil action is inherent in the right to a fair trial.
Id. at 778. From this conclusion, the court reasoned that any impairment of a civil
plaintiff's ability to ask insurance questions during voir dire would inhibit her exercise
of peremptory challenges, and this in turn would jeopardize her right to an impartial
jury. Id. at 779. Relying upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part on other grounds, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), a criminal case in which the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of peremptory
challenges to strike black jurors absent a "pattern" of racial discrimination, the
Kiernan court held it automatic reversible error for the district court to refuse to allow
insurance questions during voir dire. Kiernan, 347 F.2d at 779-80.
Much has changed, however, in the twenty-five years since Kiernan and Swain
were decided. In recent years, the Swain decision has been substantially eroded. While
Swain attributed a pre-eminent role to peremptory challenges in upholding the fair
trial guarantee of the Constitution, contemporary jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
does not. In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected "the
notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the
constitutional right to an impartial jury." Id. at 88. Noting that peremptory challenges
"are not of constitutional dimension[,]" the Court found such challenges not to be ends
in themselves, but only the means to achieving the end of providing an impartial jury.
Id. "So long as the jury that sits is impartial[,]" the Court maintained, "the fact that the
defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result [when a challenge
for cause would have sufficed] does not mean that the Sixth Amendment was violated."
Id.
Even more than in the criminal context, the importance of peremptory challenges
generally, and of voir dire specifically, has been eviscerated in the civil realm. In
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), the plaintiff
had requested a new trial after he learned that a juror during voir dire had withheld
information which supposedly would have revealed a ground for a peremptory strike.
Id. at 551. By failing to answer the voir dire inquiry correctly, the plaintiff contended,
the juror had impaired his right to exercise his peremptory challenges intelligently. Id.
The Court refused to find that this impairment automatically entitled the plaintiff to a
new trial without a showing of prejudice. In applying the harmless error doctrine, the
Court opined:
1194 [Vol. 52:1177
INS URANCE EXCL USIONAR Y RULE
proponent may choose from a panorama of exceptions to justify the
reference. l4 Because the meaning of "good faith" varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, and from judge to judge, the application and interpretation
of this standard is likely to lead to arbitrary and inconsistent findings by
courts from case to case. 105
The disparate ways in which the good faith standard is applied during
voir dire and trial pose an additional problem. Because good faith for
asking insurance questions may generally be established merely by showing
that the defendant is insured (and this is commonly achieved), 106 it is a rare
case in which such an inquiry will be excluded. If jurors will be introduced
to the issue of insurance at this stage of the litigation, critics see little good
in excluding such references at trial. 107 Once the jurors have been
indoctrinated to the belief of the existence of insurance, it is unlikely that
further indoctrination could occur. Accordingly, subsequent references to
A trial represents an important investment of private and social resources,
and it ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to
recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an item of
information which objectively he should have obtained from a juror during voir
dire examination.
Id. at 555.
The rationale of these cases stands in sharp contrast to the Kiernan decision and
the position of the exclusionary rule's critics. While the latter maintain that insurance
questions are necessary to preserve the peremptory challenge process, which in turn is
indispensable to a fair trial in civil cases, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that
limitations may be placed upon the scope of voir dire and the exercise of peremptory
challenges when it is reasonable to do so. Such restraints are not grounds for
automatic reversal, but must be proved prejudicial by the party seeking to overcome
them. It follows that there is no substantive requirement that insurance questions be
posed during voir dire. Such questions may be restricted or precluded so long as the
district court has otherwise ensured that the jury selected is reasonably impartial and
capable of affording the parties a fair trial.
104 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
105 See Slough, supra note 7, at 715-16.
106 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties are permitted to learn
during discovery the identity of the other's liability insurer and the extent of coverage.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). Thus, the threshold showing of "need,"premised as it is on
the mere disclosure of the insurer, is now easily met. In fact, the utilization of Rule
26(b)(2) has become so universal, that insurance questions have become a permanent
feature in most standardized interrogatory forms for civil actions. See, e.g., D.
DANNER, PATrERN INTERROGATORIES: BASIC FACTs 140-41 (Cum. Supp. 1985); 6
BENDER'S FoRMs OF DIsCOVERY 312-37 (1991). Thus, it is difficult to imagine an
insurance question proponent ever failing to satisfy the good faith standard as so
applied.
107 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 597; 23 C. WIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 2, § 5362, at 435-36.
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insurance during trial are unlikely to have any prejudicial impact upon the
panel. 108
Finally, as a result of the ambiguity in the good faith standard, and the
numerous exceptions carved out of the exclusionary rule, critics point out
that the rule's effective implementation has been clouded by uncertainty.10 9
Any time reference is made to insurance, either by the witnesses or the
attorneys, a possible ground for error may arise. 110 Thus, to protect the
record for appeal, a cautious defense attorney is likely to follow each
reference with an objection.111 Invariably, such an objection must be
resolved at side-bar after a sometimes lengthy discussion with the judge
and opposing counsel. 112 Often, if the reference is determined to be
inappropriate, the judge will then instruct the jury to disregard what it had
heard. 113 Not only does this consume time, but as will be discussed later, it
may also serve to confuse or even prejudice the jury. 114 A trial record
sown with insurance references, objections, and instructions in turn will
precipitate post-trial motions and even appeals. 115 Ultimately, resolution of
these matters will depend upon the presumed idiosyncratic predisposition
of the judge either in favor of or against the rule itself.1 16
IV. RE-EXAMINING THE SUBSTANTIVE CRITICISMS
The criticisms of the insurance exclusionary rule raise some serious
questions about its current validity. The most critical of these attacks are
those that challenge the rule's substantive merit-i.e., its efficacy, purpose,
and propriety. Indeed, if, as the critics assert, the disclosure of insurance is
not prejudicial, can be remedied with instructions, or is legitimate
evidence, then there is no need for the rule. Accordingly, there could be no
justification for retaining it, regardless of how efficiently it has been
implemented. Thus, before investigating ways of expediting the rule's
application, this Part re-examines the critical assaults against the
underlying premises of the rule, and its usefulness in modern litigation.
108 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 597.
109 Id.; Slough, supra note 7, at 712-13.
110 Ratner, supra note 7, at 328.
111 Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 276, 330 P.2d 468, 473 (1958).
112 Id.
113 Slough, supra note 7, at 712-13.
114 Id. It appears that cautionary instructions cause juries to focus on the matter
they are told to disregard. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
115 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 597; Green, supra note 7, at
167; Note, supra note 6, at 137.
116 Although the insurance exclusionary rule has had a history of fairly strict
enforcement, some judges now avoid, circumvent, or ignore it. See Slough, supra
note 7, at 713.
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A. Validating the Need for the Rule
Although the substantive criticisms of the rule bear an abstract appeal,
they have never been supported by empirical evidence. On the contrary,
the research now available on the subject not only refutes these criticisms,
it tends to substantiate the assumptions underlying the rule of exclusion. As
discussed below, recent studies suggest that jury indoctrination on the
question of insurance is not only possible, but likely, and is not inhibited
but exacerbated by cautionary instructions. Nor are the effects of such
indoctrination benign; rather, they tend to have a significant influence on
the verdicts of juries, both in the imposition of liability and in the award of
damages. Insofar as the exclusionary rule impedes such indoctrination and
its effects, its continued application appears defensible.
1. Indoctrination Through Insurance References and the Presumption
of Insurance Awareness
The results from a recent study conducted by the Roscoe Pound
Foundation undermine the growing assumption that all or even most jurors
presume that civil defendants carry liability insurance. 117 The study
involved three hundred fifty-two jurors from thirty-eight different civil
trials conducted in state and federal courts in southeastern Pennsylvania.11 8
The jurors were asked to answer two survey forms covering a variety of
subjects relating to their jury experience.'1 9 When asked: "Did you think
that the defendant carried insurance?" only fifty-four percent of all jurors
responding answered affirmatively, eight percent responded in the
negative, and thirty-eight percent stated that they "never thought about
it."120 With regard to jurors who heard suits in federal court, the results
were even more damaging-just forty-nine percent thought the defendant
was insured, while forty percent never considered the issue.121 Ninety-four
117 The results of the Pound study are reported and analyzed in J. GUINTHER,
supra note 17, at xxviii, 385-87.
118 The Pound study also surveyed 7 civil juries from. cases tried in Columbus,
Ohio, and included a phone survey of 98 jurors who served in civil actions in
Phoenix, Arizona. Id. at xxviii. With only insignificant differences, the Columbus and
Phoenix surveys confirmed the findings from southeastern Pennsylvania. Id.
119 The surveys consisted of a long and short form. The long form included 78
questions and was completed by the jurors at home. Id. The shorter form had 46 items
and was answered by the jurors in the courtroom immediately following the trial. Id.
120 Id. at 298-99 (question 14).
121 Id.
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percent of all jurors who believed the defendant was insured based their
conclusion on their own personal experiences.122
The numbers provided by the Pound study fail to support the sweeping
generalization that all jurors presume the existence of insurance. They
indicate that only about half of all jurors come to court believing that there
may be insurance to cover a judgment. For this group, the disclosure of
insurance either before or during trial may have little or no indoctrinating
effect. However, for the other half of the members of the jury, who make
no such assumption, the effect may be quite potent.
This effect is demonstrated by the results of the Chicago Jury Project.
This study, which was conducted in the late 1950s, examined twenty-three
cases tried before juries in a single federal court to answer some of the
more perplexing and yet intriguing questions plaguing the administration of
the American jury trial system. 123 Of particular interest to the project
coordinators was the indoctrinating impact, if any, .of insurance references
on juries. 124 The findings of the survey confirmed the assumption that such
references do promote indoctrination.
In nine cases studied, the plaintiff's counsel was permitted to inquire of
the venire whether any member was in any way connected with the
defendant's insurance company.125 In each case, the question was posed to
the entire panel in substantially the following form: "Is anyone here
connected in any way or have any interest in the.., insurance company
[specifically naming defendant's insurer, but not mentioning that it was
defendant's insurer], whether as [a] stockholder, officer, employee,
policyholder, or otherwise?" 126
Following these trials, eighty-six of the jurors who served in these
cases were interviewed to determine whether the voir dire inquiry had
served to inform them that the defendant was insured. Forty-five of the
jurors, over half of those interviewed, admitted that they assumed from the
question that the defendant was insured. 127 Specifically, when asked what
had run through their minds after the question was asked, the jurors
responded either "the defendant's insurance company" or "that the
defendant was insured."128 Thirty-one of those questioned indicated that
122 Id. at 299 (question 15).
123 Background on the history, scope, and purpose of the project is provided by
Professor Dale Broeder, one of its coordinators, in Broeder, The University of
Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 744-53 (1958).
124 See Broeder, supra note 41, at 521-25 (focusing on insurance questions asked
during voir dire).
125 Id. at 524-25.
126 Id. at 524.
127 Id. at 525.
128 Id.
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they thought of "nothing" in response to the insurance inquiry.' 29 The
remaining ten jurors revealed their assumption that the question was
intended to elicit their connections to the plaintiff's insurer.1 30
The fact that a majority of those venire members exposed to the
insurance questions were then moved to speculate as to the existence of the
defendant's insurance appears to provide a testimonial to the effectiveness
of voir dire in the art of indoctrination.1 31 If this were not the case,
presumably few or none of the venire members would have made the
connection between the question and the defendant's insurer. The fact that
a greater number of jurors did not make this connection is also significant.
Had an extremely high tally of venire members correlated the insurance
inquiry with the existence of the defendant's insurance coverage, it would
be a reasonable surmise that the jurors already were sensitive to the role of
insurance in any given case, and that the insurance reference during voir
dire merely heightened that sensitivity. That only a bare majority of the
jurors interviewed displayed this sensitivity belies the presumption that
knowledge of insurance was pervasive among all. 132 It suggests, rather,
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Because the jurors were only asked about a specific insurance carrier, and
were not questioned for their connections to the insurance industry generally, it is
unclear whether such indoctrination varies depending upon the nature of the insurance
reference made, and if so, to what extent.
132 Another, more recent, study may also subvert this presumption. In 1985, the
Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice published a report which culminated five
years of research on jury decisions in San Francisco and Cook County, Illinois
(including Chicago). See Peterson & Chin, Juries Don't Ignore Assets And Identity of
Defendant, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1985, at 15. The study focused on 15,000 cases
decided between 1959 and 1980.
Although the survey revealed a high level of stability in the jury decisions during
the subject time frame, it suggested that jurors tended to be biased in their treatment
of different types of litigants. According to the study, "deep pocket" defendants were
dealt with much more harshly by juries than their less financially resourceful
counterparts. Id. at 16. Specifically, the data revealed that businesses were 10% more
likely to be found liable to severely injured plaintiffs than private individuals. Id. This
disparity in treatment was even more magnified in the size of the awards rendered
against each category of defendant. Awards against businesses were generally 50%
higher than those incurred by individual defendants. Id. And when the plaintiff was
severely injured, the disparity in judgment size rose over 400%. Id.
From this disparate treatment three inferences might be drawn. One inference is
that jurors simply do not consider the existence or nonexistence of insurance in
rendering their decisions, but rather base their determinations in part on the
defendant's perceived ability to satisfy a judgment. A second inference is that
insurance coverage is factored into juries' subjective decisionmaking processes,
though it is attributed only to the larger, more financially secure corporate defendants.
Finally, it could be inferred that, although juries presume the existence of insurance
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coverage for all defendants, they treat corporate litigants differently because of some
other intangible factor, including perhaps the impersonal nature of such business
entities or their ability to absorb an increase in insurance premiums.
The first two inferences are consistent with the Rand study's reaffirmation of
juries' sensitivities to the economic status of defendants and, concurrently, debunk the
primary criticism of the insurance exclusionary rule-that juries generally presume
that all defendants are insured. Were this presumption sound, there would be no need
for-jurors to distinguish defendants based upon their perceived financial status. The
ability of all defendants to satisfy a judgment would be basically the same in the eyes
of the jury-each would rely on the "deep pocket" of its insurer. According to the
Rand report, however, the juries studied did not treat all defendants merely as
conduits through which liability would be passed on to more opulent insurers. Instead,
damages were doled out according to the perceived economic assets of each particular
defendant.
The third inference-that jurors presume insurance coverage and distinguish
defendants on the basis of intangible factors-is possible though less likely. In fact, the
only intangible factor that might explain the different treatment of defendants when all
are presumed insured is the effect which the imposition of liability may have upon the
defendant's ability to pay increased insurance premiums that are likely to result from
an adverse judgment. Recent evidence, however, suggests that most jurors do not in
this way consider the impact which their verdict will have upon the defendant. See J.
GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 329-30 (two percent of jurors surveyed indicated a
concern that a verdict for the plaintiff would impose too much of a financial burden on
the defendant; six percent considered the ability of a "big business" defendant to pay a
judgment in deciding to render a verdict for the plaintiff).
To the extent that jurors distinguish unincorporated defendants from their
incorporated counterparts on the basis of empathy, this factor would be vitiated by the
presumed awareness that in civil litigation insurance companies are the "real parties in
interest." Insurance companies share the same impersonal, corporate characteristics as
other large businesses. Thus, if a jury's decision would be influenced by the
impersonal nature of a corporate defendant, it stands to reason that the jury would
share the same distaste for insurance companies, which are themselves incorporated.
Accordingly, if jurors presume that insurers hide behind the veil of all primary
defendants, then the identity of the insurer would supplant that of the actual defendant
in the eyes of the jury. As a result, all combined defendant-insurer "defense entities"
should be equally unsympathetic in the eyes of the jury, and all should be subject to
the increased likelihood of incurring liability, regardless of the sympathetic identity of
the primary defendant.
In other words, if all defendants are presumed to have insurance coverage
providing an adequate or even abundant source of assets to pay a judgment, then, all
other factors being equal, the likelihood and extent of liability should be the same for
all similarly situated defendants. It would not matter that one defendant is a private
individual and the other a large corporation. Since both are assumed to carry liability
insurance, the perceived financial status of each defendant should be irrelevant to the
jury's determination. Any concern harbored by the jury pertaining to the financial
consequences of its verdict would be assuaged by the presence of insurance coverage.
According to the Rand study, however, the perceived financial status of the
defendant is not only considered by juries, it often is determinative of the issues of
liability and damages. According to this survey, any information which tends to
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that this knowledge was peculiar to only certain individuals, and that for
others, such knowledge could be implanted into their minds by use of
insurance questions during voir dire. 133
2. Outcome Determinism and the Ineffectiveness of Cautionary
Instructions
Although the above segment of the Chicago Jury Project lends support
to the initial premise of the insurance exclusionary rule (that insurance
questions tend to indoctrinate prospective jurors), another segment
decidedly verifies the rule's second premise (that such indoctrination tends
to have an effect upon the outcome of cases). In turn, it undermines the
myth, endorsed by the rule's critics, that cautionary instructions can
eradicate the effect of insurance indoctrination precipitated during voir
dire.
In this facet of the Chicago study, thirty "experimental" juries were
played tape recordings of a mock trial that was based upon an actual
case.134 The case involved an auto accident in which the plaintiff, a forty-
year-old stenographer, sustained injury when her vehicle collided with that
of the defendant.135
Three different versions of the case were played before different jury
panels. In one version, the defendant revealed to the jury that he possessed
no insurance and no objection was made by counsel to this disclosure. 136 In
another treatment, however, the defendant did indicate that he owned
insurance. No objection to this disclosure was raised by either counsel. 137
Finally, in the last version, the defendant again revealed his insurance
coverage, but this time defense counsel objected, and the court directed the
jury to disregard the reference. 138
identify the defendant as, or associate the defendant with, a "deep pocket" will have a
profound effect upon a jury panel.
133 Professor Broeder, one of the Project coordinators, cautions that most of the
jurors interviewed in the study did not cite the voir dire reference as the primary
factor in their belief that the defendant was insured. Rather, most jurors had to be
questioned specifically concerning the indoctrinating effect of the reference before
recalling the impact which it had upon them. Broeder, supra note 41, at 525.
Nevertheless, he cited several examples from the study in which indoctrination "really
worked,"id at 522-24, and concluded that "the use of the [insurance] question was by
no means entirely unsuccessful in achieving its purpose."Id. at 525.
134 This segment of the Chicago Jury Project was analyzed and discussed in
Broeder, supra note 123, at 753-54.
135 Id. at 753.
136 Id. at 753-54.
137 Id. at 754.
138 Id.
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The results of this experiment illuminate the hazards of any
inappropriate reference to insurance either before or during trial. When the
juries were aware that the defendant was not insured, the average award of
all verdicts was $33,000.139 This figure increased when the existence of the
defendant's insurance was made known to the juries. In such cases, the
average damage award approximated $37,000.140
Most striking, however, are the results achieved in those scenarios
when the fact of insurance was not only disclosed by the defendant, but
also referred to by the judge, albeit in a cautionary instruction. Those
juries exposed to this tape awarded an average of $46,000 to the plaintiff, a
full $9,000 and twenty-four percent higher than when no cautionary
instruction was given at all. 14 1
Professor Dale W. Broeder, who participated in parts of the Chicago
Jury Project, has summarized the important implications of this exercise:
First, that juries tend to award less when they know that an individual
defendant is not insured; and, second, that where they know defendant is
insured and a fuss is made over it the verdict will be higher than when no
such fuss is made. The objection and instruction to disregard, in other
words, sensitize the jurors to the fact that defendant is insured and thereby
increase the award. 142
The findings in this aspect of the Chicago Jury Project were based
solely upon extrapolations from the disparate verdicts returned by the
juries for each of the different trial scenarios. They were not derived from
an examination of the actual content of the juries' deliberations. Other
studies, however, have utilized this approach to ascertain the effect of
insurance considerations upon the decision making process of civil juries.
These studies confirm the results of the Chicago Jury Project. In one,
when the deliberations of mock juries were recorded on audiotape, the
author noticed jurors spending "some time" discussing the plaintiff's and
defendant's insurance. 143 In still others, the mock juries were observed to
"discuss matters the judge told them to ignore or which were not
mentioned in the trial, with insurance apparently the topic most likely to
turn up in civil jury debates."144
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.142 Id.
143 Kessler, Social Psychology, supra note 17, at 83 (discussing Kessler, A
Content Analytic Comparison of the Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Making
Processes (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan)).
144 J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 88 (citing Kessler, Social Psychology, supra
note 17, at 83; Erlander, Jury Research in America, 4 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 345, 350-
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The most notable of these studies, and the most recent, is that
conducted by the Roscoe Pound Foundation. 145 Although the directors of
the study did not record or observe jury deliberations, their findings were
premised upon questionnaire answers that provided significant information
about the juries' deliberative processes. 146 Like the previous studies, the
results of the Pound survey indicate that a significant number of the jurors
considered the availability of insurance in their finding of liability and
award of damages.
Of the fifty-four percent of the jurors participating in the Pound study
who believed that the defendant in each case was insured, 147 eleven percent
of the federal jurors, and six percent of the total responding, revealed that
knowledge of the defendant's insurance coverage made an "important"
difference in their decisions. 148 Twenty-three percent of those who believed
the defendant was insured stated that this fact affected their decisions in at
least "a minor way."149 Thus, of all jurors surveyed, approximately fifteen
percent were in some way influenced by the presumed existence of the
defendant's insurance coverage.
According to the survey, plaintiffs were similarly effected. When asked
if they considered in their deliberations whether the plaintiff was covered
by Blue Cross or Workers' Compensation, twenty-nine percent of the
surveyed jurors responded affirmatively. 150 Out of this group, this
assumption made an important difference in the decisions of six percent.151
Thirty-six percent of the remaining jurors who shared this assumption
admitted its influence "in a minor way" upon their judgment. 152 With
respect to jurors in the federal actions who voted for the defendant, eight
percent indicated that they might have voted for the plaintiff, but did not
because they believed that the plaintiff was insured. 153
51 (1970) (citing Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award,
19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958))).
145 See generally, J. GUINTHER, supra note 17 (recounting the history, purpose,
and results of the Pound study).
146 See id. at xxvii-xxviii.
147 Id. at 298-99 (question 14), 343.
148 Id. at 299 (question 16).
149 Id. Nearly 28% of those jurors sitting in state trials admitted that their belief
that the defendant was insured influenced their decision in at least a minor way. Id.
150 Id. at 303 (question 30), 342. Thirty-six percent of the state jurors admitted to
discussing the availability to the plaintiff of Blue Cross or Workers' Compensation. Id.
151 Id. Specifically the question asked: "[D]o you think it [the discussion
regarding the availability to the plaintiff of Blue Cross or Workers' Compensation
benefits] made a difference in your decision?" Six percent marked the following
preprinted response: "Yes, very much so."Id. at 303 (question 31).
152 Id. at 303 (question 31), 342.
153 Id. at 328-29 (question 67).
1991] 1203
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The figures suggest that the size of the verdicts awarded also was
influenced by the jurors' presumptions concerning insurance. Although no
juror admitted basing her decision exclusively on the possible availability
of insurance, twenty-seven percent of the total considered the amount of
insurance coverage among all defendants in reaching a determination. 154
Thirteen percent of surveyed jurors revealed that they lowered the award to
the plaintiff on the assumption that some of the plaintiff's losses were
already covered by insurance. 155 Nearly half of the total, forty-seven
percent, at least discussed the possibility of plaintiff's insurance coverage
during deliberations. 156
Of all these studies, those based upon direct observation of jury
deliberations are probably the most accurate and hence the most difficult to
second-guess. Nevertheless, each of the methodologies employed in these
studies is vulnerable to some criticism. 157 The "mock jury" technique used
in the Chicago and direct observation studies has been challenged on
several grounds. Often, the "mock jurors" are not screened for bias as are
"real"jurors. 158 In any event, since they are not "real"jurors, and thus are
not burdened with the actual responsibility of resolving a dispute which
will affect the lives of actual litigants, it has been suggested that their
consideration of "moot" questions will differ from that of an actual jury. 159
Also, the fact that the "mock"jurors are usually aware that they are a part
of ah experiment, and are being observed for this purpose, may cause them
to become self-conscious about their deliberations. 160
154 1d. at 327. These jurors indicated, however, that it was not the "main" factor
in making up their minds. Id.
155 Id. at 330.
156 Id.
157 In fact, none of the methodologies employed to study the decisionmaking
process of jurors has escaped criticism. The different techniques and their drawbacks
are discussed by Guinther in The Jury in America. See J. GUINTHER, supra note 17.
Besides evaluating the mock jury method used in the Chicago Jury Project and the
survey method used in the Pound study, Guinther describes the problems with "expert
opinion analysis" of jury verdicts as employed by Kalven and Zeisel in their seminal
work, The American Jury. Id. at xviii. There, Kalven and Zeisel assessed the
"correctness" of jury verdicts, given a variety of factors, by comparing them to those
reached by the judge in the same case, whose expertise, the authors maintained, was
"undeniable." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 17, at 46. As Guinther points out,
not only is the concept of a "correct" verdict too subjective and thus too elusive to
verify, judges who make such a determination are not always competent to do so. J.
GUINTHER, supra note 17, at xviii-xxi.
158 j. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at xxii.
159 Id.
160 Id. at xxiii. This phenomenon will be examined in greater detail infra notes
283-99 and accompanying text.
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Whatever the merits of these criticisms, they do not destroy the insight
which mock jury experiments afford. Though the artificiality of the
exercise obviously impairs its usefulness, it is nevertheless apparent that it
sheds light on the way individuals in a controlled setting react to the
presentation of facts through testimony and argument. The consistency of
results achieved by these and other jury research techniques indicates a
marked similarity in the decisionmaking process of control groups to jury-
like problems. 161
Whatever the drawbacks to the methodology of the Chicago study, the
survey method employed in the Pound study appears immune from these
criticisms. In the Pound study the individuals surveyed were actual jurors
who had heard "real" cases. Thus, the aspect of artificiality inherent in the
mock jury technique was not a factor in assessing the accuracy of the
results obtained. 162 Nevertheless, because Pound relied upon post-
deliberation questionnaires, instead of direct observation, the results
obtained might be attacked on the ground that the responses of the jurors
surveyed were self-serving or distorted given the passage of time following
the rendition of the verdicts. 163 This seems a weak criticism, however, as
such distortions were minimized in the Pound study by having the surveyed
jurors record their reflections in writing either immediately or shortly after
the conclusion of trial. 164
To the extent that the results achieve a considerable consistency, they
garner even greater empirical credibility. They suggest that the phantom of
insurance is constantly lurking within the jury room. Contrary to the
protestations of a growing number of nay sayers, juries do consider the
existence of insurance in resolving the issues of liability and damages. 165 In
161 See id. at xxiv.
162 Id. at xxvii-xxviii.
163 See id. at xxvii.
164 Id. at xxviii. Reducing the jurors' responses to writing seems to have two
salutary effects. First, since most people tend to take the written as opposed to the
spoken word more seriously, jurors are more likely to provide an accurate and
thoughtful recollection of their experiences if done so in a written medium. See V.
STARR & M. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 10A.1.5, at 85 (Supp. 1990) (indicating
that prospective jurors are more likely to provide accurate information concerning
their biases when requested to do so in a written questionnaire, than when asked to do
so orally during voir dire). Second, even though a public oral disclosure may
embarrass and inhibit the respondent, or evoke an inaccurate response, the written
survey allows the juror to answer honestly and without inhibition. See id. § 10A. 1.1,
at 82-83 (Supp. 1990).
165 Even so, critics of the exclusionary rule are often heard to argue that there is
no clear proof that the consideration of insurance has a prejudicial influence upon the
verdicts of juries. See, e.g., Green, supra note 7, at 160-61. While the judgments
returned may be slightly higher, there is no indication that these awards are unfair or
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any given case, this consideration can have a profound effect on either the
plaintiff or the defendant. 166 Even if the presumed existence of insurance
unsupported by the evidence. Id. It is possible, they believe, that without such
considerations, the jury may presume that the defendant is not insured, and thus return
a verdict which is too low. Id.
Although this is a valid concern, it is not one which is currently capable of proof.
What is reasonable and fair is subjective, and might vary from jury to jury. What is
certain, however, is that the defendant is entitled to have its liability determined
without regard for its ability to absorb the financial consequences of a verdict
rendered against it. This rule is premised on the institutional assumption that verdicts
are more accurate and thus more fair without such evidence. Indeed, there is some
evidence that jurors tend to award higher damages against deep pocket defendants than
do judges who are less likely to be influenced by the identities of the parties, and thus
may be better barometers of what is "reasonable." See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
supra note 17. To" argue that verdicts only completely compensate plaintiffs when
evidence of insurance coverage is disclosed is to indict the entire jury system in
America which excludes such considerations.
Perhaps the only way of ascertaining the true operation of insurance evidence on
jury verdicts is to examine the deliberations of juries. By observing this process, it
might be possible to determine whether juries use insurance considerations to
undercompensate plaintiffs or to punish defendants. See infra notes 274-308 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the ramifications of observing
jury deliberations.
166 The finding of the Pound and Chicago studies that jurors often presume
insurance coverage for both defendants and plaintiffs may appear to be a double edged
sword. Those who favor the admission of insurance evidence might argue that,
because the conflicting presumptions cancel each other out, the introduction of
insurance questions is not likely to affect either party. This nullification process might
work in two ways: when the same juror makes both presumptions and thus uses them
adversely against neither party; or when an equal number of jurors on a panel make
one such presumption, so that in deliberations neither presumption can dominate the
decisionmaking process.
This argument, however, fails to withstand closer scrutiny. The results of these
studies do not indicate that the same jurors make both presumptions. In fact, the
responses suggest just the opposite. For those jurors who presumed the existence of
the defendant's insurance, this fact was for some enough to make an important
difference in their decisions about the case, regardless of any other assumptions they
may have made about the parties or the issues. The same was true of many jurors who
admitted to considering the existence of collateral sources of compensation for the
plaintiff.
The nullification process is no more likely to occur within the jury as a whole.
Although it is statistically possible, it is improbable in any given case that equal
numbers of jurors will bring with them these disparate presumptions. Nor is it possible
presently to determine when, or if, a jury is so constituted. In any event, even if such
a division appeared in all juries, this would not ensure that one or the other
presumption would not predominate the decision of the jury as a whole. Indeed, often
entire juries are moved by the persuasive statements of a single member. In addition,
while an insurance reference made by a witness or judge may be susceptible to either
1206 [Vol. 52:1177
INSURANCE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
coverage is only one among many factors considered by the jury, the
possibility that it may be the deciding factor renders it potentially
prejudicial to the party against whom such a mistaken belief is used. 167
B. Reaffirming the Rule's Legitimacy
Even if speculations about insurance do influence juries, as the data
now seems to suggest, critics assert that this influence is a necessary and
positive one, not an improper one that must be curbed by a rule of
exclusion. They say that juries should consider the existence of insurance,
not only because it reflects upon the prudence of the insured-defendant,
but, more importantly, because it ensures that insurers are treated like
presumption, an insurance question posed by counsel during voir dire realistically is
not. Jurors are familiar with the adversarial nature of litigation, in which parties are
always seeking to protect their own interests. Thus, when plaintiff's counsel attempts
to ask the question (a common scenario in voir dire), it is likely that jurors will assume
that the question relates to the defendant's insurer, since only their connections to this
carrier could bias them against the plaintiff.
Regardless of the interplay between these presumptions, the fact is that any
consideration of either party's sources for absorbing the loss is improper. Just as Rule
411 prohibits the use of insurance evidence to prove negligence, see supra note 58,
the collateral source doctrine precludes the diminution of the plaintiff's recovery
because of the availability of insurance to pay for part of the injury sustained. See
generally, Annotation, Prejudicial Effect of Bringing to Jury's Attention Fact that
Plaintiff in Personal Injury or Death Action Is Entitled to Worker's Compensation
Benefits, 69 A.L.R.4th 131 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (collecting cases on collateral source
doctrine); Annotation, Collateral Source Rule: Right of Tortfeasor To Mitigate
Opponent's Damages for Loss of Earning Capacity by Showing that His Compensation,
Notwithstanding Disability, Has Been Paid by His Employer, 7 A.L.R.3d 516 (1966 &
Supp. 1991) (same). Introducing insurance questions during voir dire will only serve
to encourage or at least facilitate such untoward considerations.
167 Guinther concludes from the Pound study that "insurance... does not appear
to have, in most cases, a substantive effect either on [the] verdict or on an amount of
award rendered." J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 99. Although this assessment seems
reasonable purely from a comparative, quantitative standpoint, it seems less
reasonable when it is remembered that even one juror who erroneously considers the
existence of insurance can influence all others. The fact is, under the Pound findings,
nearly a third of all jurors at least consider in their deliberations whether either the
plaintiff or defendant possesses insurance. Id. at 98. Translated into actual numbers
for any given jury panel, this means that at least three or four of every twelve-member
panel will ruminate over and possibly discuss the existence of insurance in the jury
room. Not only could this group prevent a unanimous verdict when required, it could
serve to influence the outcome of both liability and damage issues. Given this insidious
potential, any evidence which identifies or even implies the existence of insurance
may significantly affect the ability of the parties to receive a fair trial.
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other "interested" defendants, and it facilitates a fairer apportionment of
the loss between the parties.
The last of these arguments is not directed at the insurance
exclusionary rule alone. Rather, it is a more general attack upon the fault
system of liability used in every jurisdiction in this country. 168 It would
allow damages to be assessed not upon the blameworthiness of the
defendant's conduct, but upon the ability of the defendant to pay a
judgment. 169 A complete response to such a broad argument is beyond the
scope of this Article, and, in any event, has been adequately provided
elsewhere. 170 Suffice it to say that such a loss distribution system has never
been adopted as a general basis of tort liability in the United States. Until it
is, the argument that the exclusionary rule inhibits this sort of loss
distribution not only fails to support its abandonment, but favors its
retention.
Equally spurious is the argument that the defendant's insurance
coverage is relevant to the issue of fault because it illuminates the
defendant's risk taking propensities. 171 When the defendant is required by
law or contract to be insured, a frequent scenario in many civil cases, the
existence of insurance is not discretionary and thus cannot be attributed
either to prudence or carelessness. In such cases, therefore, this fact is
irrelevant in assessing the propriety of the defendant's behavior. But even
when the defendant acquires coverage voluntarily, the inference of fault
from this decision is, as the drafters of Rule 411 observed, merely "a
tenuous one."172 Indeed, rather than reflecting the defendant's carefree
nature, the existence of insurance coverage may give rise to the opposite
inference. As one commentator has noted: "[A] person who drives an
automobile without protection of public liability insurance is more of a
gambler than is the insured driver and hence more likely to take a
chance. "173
An ostensibly more compelling criticism of the rule is that it unfairly
protects insurance companies from their own "deep pocket" identities, a
disguise not afforded to other interested parties. But even this assertion
fails to withstand closer scrutiny. The most obvious response to this
concern comes from within the fold of the critics themselves. Professor
168 See Gay, supra note 16, at 368-69.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 Indeed, many of the critics themselves do not find this argument persuasive.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 597; 1 M. MARTIN, supra note 7, §
10.05(e), at 253-54; Slough, supra note 7, at 710.
172 FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee's note.
173 See Gay, supra note 16, at 370.
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McCormick, who described the rule as a "hollow shell," 174 has concluded
that:
[Tlhis argument begs the question. If the substantive law is that the depth
of the defendant's pocket has nothing to do with liability or damages, then
why should the jury be apprised of this fact? To be sure, in many cases the
relative wealth of the parties is manifest. A multinational corporation
cannot disguise itself as a struggling member of the proletariat. But where
admittedly irrelevant characteristics can be removed from the courtroom
without great strain, it is hard to see why they should be retained. 175
On a juridical basis, this response seems satisfactory. The law in this area
sets an ideal standard for guiding the decisionmaking process of the jury. It
says that jurors are not to consider the financial status of the parties in
reaching a verdict. This ideal would become a mockery, however, if
insurers were disclosed as real parties in interest during litigation. It now
seems clear that the presence of "deep pocket" entities in litigation entices
jurors to disregard this standard.176 Insurers, whose sole function is to
serve as a financial safety net for their clients, are probably more
vulnerable to the deep pocket stigma than any primary defendant. Thus, to
publicize the insurer's interest in litigation would, in effect, amount to an
invitation to the jurors to ignore the prohibition against considering the
financial status of the parties.
Nevertheless, the foregoing response is less than convincing from a
fairness standpoint. Because juries do consider the primary defendant's
financial status in reaching their verdicts, critics wonder why insurance
companies should be free from this tendency. To answer this question, one
must seek to determine whether the primary defendant's identity may play
a legitimate role in the jury's deliberations, and if so, whether the same is
true for nonparty insurers.
All that is really known for sure is that when the defendant is perceived
to possess a "deep pocket" source of assets, juries are more likely to hold it
liable and will impose higher damages when they do. 177 It is not known,
however, precisely how the identity of the defendant figures into the jury's
judgment. 178 The prevailing assumption is that jurors view this fact in only
one way, and use it only for an illegitimate purpose. That is, they see the
defendant's wealth as a justification for meting out more severe judgments,
174 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 201, at 597.
175 Id. at 597-98.
176 See supra note 132.
177 See id. This was the conclusion of the Rand study discussed supra note 132.
The findings of this study, however, have not escaped criticism. See J. GUINTHER,
supra note 17, at 172-81.
178 See J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 174.
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and thus feel less inhibited about imposing them. The actual reason for this
phenomenon, however, may not be so simple, or so illicit.
Unlike private, unincorporated tortfeasors, large enterprises confronted
by lawsuits these days ordinarily are purveyors of products or services for
profit. When the product or service is in some way defective, causing
injury to an unsuspecting plaintiff, the purveyor's conduct in marketing
that commodity comes in question.179 Regardless of the theory of the case,
the critical question is often whether the merchant acted reasonably given
the risks associated with the enterprise.180 In undertaking this analysis, it is
perfectly -appropriate for jurors to consider whether the defendant
maximized its profit at the expense of precautionary measures.181 By
reallocating their resources to provide greater precautionary measures, such
defendants have the power to reduce or eliminate such injury producing
events. Indeed, the wealthier the enterprise, arguably the more likely it can
dedicate substantial resources to the pursuit of this objective, and the
higher the public expectation that it will do so. Although the jury may not
be apprised of the defendant's exact financial commitment to research and
development,18 2 it seems likely that jurors would consider the depth of the
defendant's pocket generally in evaluating whether it possessed the
financial ability to eliminate unreasonable risks associated with its
enterprise.
The same rationale, however, does not apply to insurers whose conduct
has not caused the plaintiff's injuries and, thus, is not in question in the
litigation. Here, the insurer possesses no power to avoid injury producing
events. Neither the extent of the insurer's assets nor the reasonableness of
their allocation is relevant to the disposition of the case. Thus, unlike
primary defendants, an insurer's identity as a "deep pocket" of financial
resources can have no legitimate role in the jury's deliberations. Rather,
jurors can draw only one inference from the disclosure of an insurer's
interest in such litigation: that it is there to provide a fund to protect the
defendant from the financial consequences of the verdict. Because this is
clearly a prohibited inference, the exclusionary rule appropriately precludes
disclosures of insurance and, in so doing, extends to insurers a measure of
protection not justified for primary defendants.
179 See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 605 n.52 (1980).
180 See Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV.
777, 784 (1983).
181 See id. at 792-93.
182 But cf. Note, Perpetuating Negligence Principles in Strict Products Liability:
77e Use of State of the Art Concepts in Design Cases, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 797,
830-34 (1985).
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V. AMELIORATING THE IMPRACTICALITY OF THE RULE
If, as the foregoing discussion suggests, the exclusionary rule still
serves a valuable function, then it is worth maintaining if it can be
implemented in a reasonably efficient manner. According to the rule's
detractors, however, the impracticality of applying the rule has far
outweighed its usefulness. Even though they bemoan the intricate set of
standards, procedures, and exceptions that have hindered its
administration, few have stopped to consider whether the baggage
inhibiting the implementation of the rule is really necessary. A closer
examination reveals that by invoking and enforcing current procedural
devices, and perhaps in creating a few new ones, much if not all of the
"impracticality" in administering the rule can be alleviated if not
eliminated.
A. Removing Insurance References from Voir Dire
As was discussed above, the application of the exclusionary rule during
voir dire has been criticized on two principal grounds: First, that the "good
faith" test for implementing it is too vague, often allowing courts to admit
insurance questions without articulating any real need for doing so;183
second, that, because of the frequent introduction of such questions, jurors
are indoctrinated to the existence of insurance before the trial even begins,
making it futile to restrict further insurance references. 184 These problems,
however, do not necessarily justify abandoning the exclusionary rule
during voir dire proceedings. In fact, it is just as easy to eliminate the
present ambiguity in this area by applying the exclusionary rule more
183 See supra text accompanying notes 101-05. It is difficult to disagree with this
criticism. Because the good faith standard focuses upon the subjective motivation of
counsel, it has produced inconsistent and arbitrary results. To the extent that the test
has been "defined" by the existence or nonexistence of insurance in each case, it
provides little guidance for determining the propriety of admitting such questions.
Indeed, with the advent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2), which allows
either party in civil litigation to discover the existence and amount of insurance
carried by the other, it is unlikely that counsel will ever fail to satisfy the good faith
standard. At any rate, premising good faith on the existence of insurance seems
illogical. If, as the rule's critics suggest, most prospective jurors now assume the
existence of insurance coverage even when there is none, it would seem appropriate to
allow the insurance questions even when neither party is insured. Because a mistaken
assumption in this regard would be as damaging as correct knowledge of insurance
established through improper indoctrination, it would seem reasonable to allow
insurance questioning in any civil case, not just those in which insurance actually plays
a role.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
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strictly. By entirely prohibiting the use of insurance questions during voir
dire, the need for the good faith standard would be obviated, and the risk
of pretrial jury indoctrination eliminated. This is not to say that the
information sought in such inquiries would remain unaccessible to counsel.
On the contrary, the same information sought during voir dire can be
acquired, with greater accuracy and expediency, through alternative
investigative techniques.
The purpose for posing insurance questions during voir dire is to
screen prospective jurors for an insurance industry bias. Usually such
questions require the venire to divulge any present or past connections they
have had with a liability insurance carrier, including personal employment
and stock holdings as well as those of their immediate families.18 5 This can
be accomplished in a couple of ways, both of which are less likely than
voir dire insurance questions to emphasize the existence of insurance in the
case.
A number of federal and state jurisdictions have imposed a carefully
crafted procedure designed to elicit insurance connections while avoiding
any reference to insurance. 186 The venire can be asked first whether they
or members of their immediate families have ever been employed by a
corporation, and if so, they can be asked to identify this employer. 187 The
court may then permit inquiry into the- nature and extent of such
employment.188 Additionally, the panel can be asked to disclose any past or
current securities that they or immediate family members may possess. 189
In combination, these questions are likely to reveal the same information as
that sought by specific insurance questions, without the risk of insurance
indoctrination.
While the above procedure still depends upon voir dire as the means of
acquiring this information, nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
185 See, e.g., Horsey v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 882 F.2d 844, 845 (3d Cir. 1989);
Hinkle v. Hampton, 388 F.2d 141, 143-44 (10th Cir. 1968).
186 This approach was endorsed in the following federal decisions: Langley v.
Turner's Express Inc., 375 F.2d 296, 297 n.2 (4th Cir. 1967); Venable v. A/S Det
Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 275 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Va. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1968); Kopycinski v. Farrar, 63 F. Supp. 857
(D.N.D.), appeal dismissed, 155 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1946). The state jurisdictions that
have implemented this alternative procedure are collected in Annotation, supra note 2,
§ 18, at 813-14 (and later case service).
187 See Safeway Cab Serv. Co. v. Minor, 180 Okla. 448, 449, 70 P.2d 76, 78
(1937).
188 See id.
189 See id.
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require the use of voir dire for this purpose. 190 Upon reflection, it appears
that the same information can be obtained, with even less risk of
prejudicial jury indoctrination, by posing such questions to prospective
jurors before voir dire in juror questionnaires.
Most federal jurisdictions already require prospective jurors to fill out
a standard juror questionnaire before coming to the courthouse. 191 This
form typically requires the respondent to disclose her occupation and the
occupation of her spouse.192 If any employment relationship exists between
the juror or her family and a liability carrier, it will be uncovered in
response to such a question. Nevertheless, such forms do not ask the
respondent to reveal past employment histories for herself and her family,
nor do they inquire into the family's stock holdings. 193 Thus, they may be
inadequate as written for counsel to thoroughly assess the impartiality of
the respondents.
This inadequacy can be remedied, however, either by amending the
standard form, or by employing supplemental juror questionnaires. 194
190 See V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 10A.2, at 87 (Supp.
1990) (because no statute or rule has been cited as prohibiting their use, the issue
appears to be one committed to the district court's discretion).
191 See G. BERMANT, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES IN UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS 7 (1982). This informative booklet, published by the Federal
Judicial Center, identifies at least two different standard questionnaire forms
commonly used by district courts-the Juror Qualification Questionnaire (AO form
178D) and the Juror Information Card (AO form 229). Id. These forms are
reproduced in the appendices of the booklet. Id. app. A&B.192 Id. at 7-8.
193 See id. at app. A.
194 This proposed solution is not new to legal literature. Indeed, it has found
particular favor with a number of commentators for over 50 years. See Slough, supra
note 7, at 717; Comment, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors Concerning Insurance
Company Interests, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 148 (1965) [hereinafter Comment, Voir Dire
Examination] (recommending that insurance questions be included on a questionnaire
and answered by prospective jurors prior to trial; thereafter, the jury would be
instructed by the court concerning the impropriety of insurance considerations in the
finding of liability or damages); Comment, The Voir Dire Insurance Dilemma, 28
MISS. L.J. 65 (1956) (advocating the use of a detailed questionnaire containing 17
specific inquiries relating to insurance connections of prospective jurors, their spouses,
children, family, and friends; also proposes state procedure for devising and
administering such a questionnaire); Recent Decisions, Practice and Procedure-Under
What Circumstances May Counsel Ask Jurors Regarding Their Interest in Insurance
Companies, on Trial of a Case Against an Insured Defendant?, 43 MICH. L. REv. 621
(1944) (suggesting the adoption in Michigan of a questionnaire apparently then used
by the Wayne Circuit Court in Detroit, Michigan); cf. Comment, Jury-Competency of
Jurors- Questioning Jurors on Voir Dire as to Their Connections with Insurance
Company, 52 HARV. L. REV. 166 (1938) (suggesting that the venire panel be
examined under oath before the commencement of each trial term).
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Supplemental juror questionnaires are usually employed in highly
publicized or complex litigation to acquire more detailed background
information concerning the experiences and attitudes of prospective
jurors.1 95 In light of the prevalence of insurance in most modern civil
litigation, and the significant number of jurors who consider its existence
as part of their decisionmaking process, 196 supplemental questions relating
to insurance should become a permanent feature on the standard
questionnaire in any civil action.
In addition to the standard questions now contained on the form,
including the occupation of the respondent and those of immediate family
members, the form might also inquire whether respondents or members of
their immediate families have ever been employed by an insurance
company, specifying the dates and nature of such employment and the
name of the employer. Respondents may also be asked whether they or
their immediate families have ever held stock in an insurance company.
Courts still concerned with the possible indoctrinating effects of such
inquiries could eliminate any reference to insurance by structuring the
questions to probe the past and present employment of the respondent and
immediate family members, together with any stock investments which
they may possess.
In this way, counsel will obtain all the information that they
traditionally have requested of prospective jurors for the purpose of
assessing their partiality for or against insurance carriers. Allowing this
line of questioning in a standard form questionnaire will thus eliminate
needless appeals by counsel denied the ability to explore this area in voir
dire and, in turn, avoid the possible prejudicial effect of indoctrination at
the early stages of litigation.
But merely asking the venire to divulge insurance connections cannot
truly ensure their fitness or unfitness to serve on a jury. To do this, it
At least one district judge has utilized the technique of gathering such sensitive
information from prospective jurors. Judge Donald S. Voorhees, formerly of the
Western District of Washington, has designed his own juror questionnaire which
includes, among many other things, questions concerning the respondents' past or
present employment in the insurance industry. See G. BERMANT, supra note 191, at 8.
195 See V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 10A.3, at 88 (Supp.
1990). The authors note that such questionnaires are most appropriate in the following
cases: highly publicized cases, id. § 10A.3.1, at 88 (Supp. 1990); cases involving
parties with high name recognition, id. § 10A.3.2, at 90 (Supp. 1990); cases in which
jurors are likely to have direct contact with a party, id. § 10A.3.3, at 95 (Supp. 1990);
cases in which personal experience influences case issues, id. § 10A.3.4, at 97 (Supp.
1990); and cases involving issues about which most jurors hold strong opinions, id.
§ 10A.3.5, at 100 (Supp. 1990). The insurance issue would seem to fall within at least
the last two categories in almost every civil action involving personal injury.
196 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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would be necessary actually to explore their assumptions and preconceived
attitudes regarding the insurance industry and the role it plays in modern
litigation. While this is uniformly prohibited during voir dire because of
the potential for prejudicial indoctrination, it might be possible to pose
such questions without this risk in a preliminary questionnaire.
In addition to the questions mentioned above, the questionnaire should
contain the following inquiries relevant to this issue: 197
a) Do you hold a favorable or unfavorable opinion concerning the
insurance industry generally, or any specific insurance company in
particular? If so, please explain the origin and nature of your opinion.
b) Do you believe that a jury's verdict should be based in whole or in part
on [the respective abilities of the parties to pay for the loss sustained?] or
[the availability to the parties of insurance which may pay for all or part of
the loss sustained?] Please explain.
c) Would you be able to reach a verdict based solely upon the law as
explained to you by the judge and the facts proved at trial, without
considering [the respective abilities of the parties to pay for the loss
sustained?] or [the availability to the parties of insurance which may pay
for all or part of the loss sustained?] Please explain.
Each of these inquiries attempts to unearth significant information that may
help identify individuals who are most likely to consider insurance in their
deliberations, and who may make such a consideration determinative on the
issues of liability and damages. The first question directly explores the
attitudes of the respondents regarding the insurance industry by requiring
them to explain their opinion and how they developed it. The second and
third interrogatories delve more subtly into the respondents' view of the
role of insurance in litigation and their ability to conform this view to the
strictures of the judicial system.
197 Before posing the questions, it might be advisable to briefly explain the
purpose of the inquiry. By eliminating the element of wonder and intrigue which the
question might otherwise hold, a brief explanatory statement could reduce the
likelihood of sensitizing the respondent to the uniqueness and importance of this
particular inquiry. The introductory statement might read:
If, under the law and the facts of a case, a party proves that another has
caused that party injury or loss, the injured party is entitled to recover from the
other damages which fully compensate for the loss sustained. The ability of either
party to pay for the loss, either personally or through insurance, is not to be
considered in determining the parties' liability or the amount of damages, if any,
to be awarded.
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Though probing, the questions should be phrased with an eye toward
minimizing the possibility of indoctrination. While the suggested questions
contain alternative phraseologies which may affect the level of
indoctrination they engender, it is believed, for reasons discussed below,
that neither version will have a prejudicial effect upon prospective jurors.
By masking the connection between the questions and the specific case
which the respondent will be called to hear, the possibility of such
indoctrination can be effectively reduced.198 One subtle way of
accomplishing this is to present the questions on a typed, standardized form
along with other questions that traditionally have been used during voir
dire to detect biases. Other subjects that might be explored include the
nature and extent of prior serious injuries, the source and amount of any
compensation received therefor, and the means of acquiring it; feelings
about religion, race, and gender; membership in organizations or unions;
and prior lawsuits. 199 Though not all of these subjects will be directly
pertinent to every case, the responses to these questions do shed important
light on the mind set of the respondents and can be preserved and updated
for future reference. Most importantly, the appearance of these additional
questions on the form would de-emphasize any potential indoctrinating
impact of the insurance questions. This impact can be curtailed even
further by including on the form a statement explaining its general purpose:
to acquire information concerning the background of prospective jurors for
use in evaluating their ability to serve in future, unspecified cases.
Just how far in advance of trial these questions should be submitted to
the venire is a tricky question. It should be long enough that the
respondents are not likely to associate their responses with the case that
they are called to hear, but not so long that the responses can become
outdated in the meantime. To achieve a balance, it is recommended that the
questionnaires be answered by the prospective jurors at least two to three
weeks before the commencement of trial. To reduce the association of the
form with a specific case, the questionnaires should be mailed to the homes
of the prospective jurors, rather than having them fill out the forms in the
courthouse in which the trial will be held.
Posing the inquiries in written, standard form questions several weeks
before voir dire promises several advantages over current practice. First, it
is likely to promote a greater sense of responsibility in the respondents to
provide thoughtful, complete, and honest answers. 2°° As the authors of one
monograph have observed, "[p]eople tend to believe the written word is
more binding than the spoken word. This is illustrated by the difference in
198 See Comment, Voir Dire Examination, supra note 194, at 156.
199 Many of these areas could provide grounds for challenging the respondent for
cause. See J. GOBERT & W. JORDAN, supra note 17, §§ 7.01-.04, at 193-200.
200 V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 10A.1.5, at 85 (Supp. 1990).
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dignity accorded a written contract in contrast to an oral contract." 20 1
Although prospective jurors will attempt to color their oral answers to voir
dire questions in order to protect their public images, they are less likely to
do so in response to private, written questions. 202 Second, and
concomitantly, given the written nature of the standard questionnaire,
prospective jurors are more likely to be aware of and take seriously the
admonition against providing perjured responses. 20 3 Third, asking
questions by written questionnaire removes the confrontational aspect of
voir dire. Many jurors report that they feel challenged in voir dire to
provide "correct" answers so that they might earn a coveted spot on the
jury panel and avoid the appearance of failure. 204 This compulsion,
however, tends to turn voir dire into a game of wits between the venire and
the judge and attorneys. Standard form questions allow the respondent to
provide private answers in a more relaxed atmosphere, thus eliminating the
confrontational mode of voir dire.205 Fourth, because the questionnaires
are answered secretly in this private setting, there is virtually no
possibility, as in voir dire, that the responses of one venire member will
influence the attitude of another. 2°6 Fifth, removing insurance questions
from voir dire can only serve to expedite that process. 207 Sixth, and
finally, the temporal and spatial distance between the execution of the
standard form by the prospective jurors and the actual commencement of
proceedings with voir dire reduces dramatically any indoctrinating effect
that the questionnaire might have upon them.
These advantages seem to override any drawbacks in this approach.
While addressing the lingering concern over the questions' indoctrinating
impact,208 this approach might be viewed as inspiring the same competitive
201 Id.
202 Id. § 1OA.1.1, at 82 (Supp. 1990).
203 Id. § 10A.1.6, at 85-86 (Supp. 1990).
204 Id. § 10A.1.3, at 84 (Supp. 1990). Studies indicate that less than half of
people called for jury duty want to get out of it. See J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at
100. In one study, 94% of individuals who had previously served on a jury declared
that they wanted to serve again. Id.
205 See V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 10A.1.3, at 84 (Supp.
1990).
206 Id. § 1OA.1.2, at 83-84 (Supp. 1990).
207 According to Starr and McCormick, authors of an extensive text on jury
selection, "[the two major reasons judges give for approving the SJQ [Supplemental
Juror Questionnaire] are that it simplifies the jury selection process and that it saves
the court both time and money." Id. § 10A.6.2, at 117 (Supp. 1990).
208 As noted above, however, it is likely that the indoctrinating effect of such
questions can be reduced not only by the temporal remoteness of the questions to the
litigation, but also by presenting them on an innocuous standardized form. In addition,
special effort could be made to downplay the importance of insurance, by focusing
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spirit in prospective jurors that at times inhibits their ability to give
completely accurate responses to voir dire questions. Because the form may
appear as a "test" of sorts, some respondents might be induced to provide
responses which they feel are "correct," but which are not necessarily true.
The nature of the form itself, however, provides some safeguards against
such an occurrence. As noted above, unlike in voir dire, the respondent
does not give the questionnaire responses in public. Thus, the possibility of
being embarrassed by an answer is eliminated, and the need to provide a
"correct," though inaccurate, answer is diminished. This tendency can be
further eradicated by requiring the respondents to supply the requested
information under oath, and thus subject to the penalties for perjury.
On balance, then, it is suggested that meaningful jury selection can be
afforded, without substantial risk of prejudicial indoctrination, by posing
questions during voir dire that eschew any reference to insurance, or by
allowing insurance questions to be posed to the prospective jurors in a
standardized jury questionnaire well in advance of voir dire. Either way,
the administration of voir dire will be expedited, the impartiality of the
jury preserved, and the justifications for allowing insurance references at
trial reduced by one.
B. Reducing Insurance References at Trial
The main problem with the administration of the exclusionary rule at
trial is the morass of "exceptions" that have nearly consumed it. Because
attorneys and courts must constantly wrangle over the applicability of the
myriad circumstances that can be used to admit "insurance evidence,"
proceedings are delayed, confusion is created among the jury, and the
seeds for mistrials and retrials are sown. The solution, or at least
amelioration, of this problem is more difficult than that in voir dire.
Nevertheless, it is not a hopeless endeavor. Indeed, a closer scrutiny of the
exceptions and the way in which they are administered reveals possible
means of improvement.
Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence delineates three exceptional
circumstances under which insurance evidence may be admitted-when it is
used to prove that a tortfeasor was insured by and therefore an agent of the
defendant; when it shows that the defendant insured a premises or structure
in which the plaintiff was injured, thereby indicating the defendant's
ownership or control of the area; and when it establishes a relationship
between a witness and the insurance industry that may demonstrate the
primarily on the ability of either party to pay for the loss sustained. Also, phrasing the
question in this manner gives appropriate recognition to the fact that jurors tend to
apply insurance awareness adversely against both plaintiffs and defendants, and thus
may serve to circumvent possible prejudice to either.
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witness's bias or interest in the litigation. 209 Although this list of
exceptions was not intended by the drafters of Rule 411 to be exclusive, 210
it does signify the circumstances that are most commonly employed to
introduce insurance evidence.
While each exception provides a possible grounds for introducing such
evidence, the court is not compelled to admit it. 211 Like other forms of
evidence, it should not be admitted unless its relevance outweighs the
possible prejudice that it may create.212 With this in mind, it is clear that
courts should be reluctant to admit such evidence, and should only do so in
a manner that minimizes its possible prejudicial impact. Although there are
ways of achieving this goal, they have not often been implemented.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that courts at common law
did not permit insurance evidence at all unless the issue for which it was
offered was in dispute.213 Although Rule 411 does not contain this
restriction in its terms, there is nothing in the comments to the rule which
suggest that this was a conscious omission. 214 Obviously, when the issue is
not in dispute, the relevance of such evidence is dramatically vitiated if not
negated entirely. Given the potentially harmful indoctrinating effects of this
evidence, there appears little basis for admitting it under these
circumstances.
But what if the issue of agency, control, or ownership is in dispute in a
lawsuit, and plaintiff's counsel wants to establish responsibility by proving
that the defendant carried liability insurance covering acts of the tortfeasor,
or covering the premises or structure where the plaintiff was injured?
Should counsel be permitted to introduce the insurance contract or to
question the witnesses for the purpose of proving these issues? The answer
should not be an automatic "yes," but should depend on a number of
factors, including the strength of the desired, permissible inferences that
the proponent seeks to establish, the need for such evidence in each
particular case, and the degree to which its introduction can be
accomplished without undue prejudice to the defendant.
209 FED. R. EvID. 411. See supra text accompanying note 61.
210 See 2 D. LOUIsELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 194, at 582; 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5365, at 454.
211 See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5365, at 455.
212 See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 194, at 586; 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5365, at 455.
213 See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5365, at 455 & n.10
(citing Walker, The Problem of Indemnity Insurance in Damage Actions as Answered
by the Courts of California, 11 S. CAL. L. REv. 407, 431 (1938); Comment, Mention
of Defendant's Liability Insurance in the Presence of a Jury, 56 NEB. L. REV. 153,
155-56 (1977)).
214 See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5365, at 455.
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Though the procurement of insurance coverage by the defendant over a
tortfeasor or dangerous structure may indicate the defendant's belief that it
is legally "responsible" for harm caused by that person or premises, this is
not the only, or even strongest, inference that might be drawn from such
evidence. It could also be inferred that the defendant is a cautious
individual who was uncertain of her legal responsibilities. 215 In any event,
the defendant's subjective belief concerning her legal responsibility for the
harm is not determinative, and could be inconsistent with the actual legal
status of the defendant as established by other facts in evidence. To the
extent the defendant's insurance contract specifically defines the
relationship of the defendant to the tortfeasor or premises, the persuasive
value of this evidence is markedly intensified. Nevertheless, the evidence
here is compelling not because of the nature of the document itself (i.e., as
an insurance contract), but because it contains an admission of the
existence of the relationship in dispute. In this situation, the effect of the
evidence as an admission can be preserved by deleting any reference to the
specific document on which it was contained. 216 So long as the plaintiff
may establish that the defendant had admitted the existence of the
relationship in a prior contract, the probative value of the evidence will be
maintained, and it often will not be necessary to identify the exact source
of the admission. Should the defendant then desire to explain the
admission, she would do so at the assumed risk of disclosing the existence
of insurance.
The relevance of the evidence in turn will affect the need for its
admission. If the insurance contract is the only evidence of agency,
ownership, or control, it may be necessary to admit it with the restriction
indicated above. Proof of these issues, however, often can be derived from
a number of sources. For example, the nature of the agency relationship
may be defined or described on a contract between the parties, pieces of
correspondence, tax forms, or other forms of demonstrative evidence.217
Since most questions of ownership or control involve real estate or
automobiles, which usually must be registered under state law, typically
these documents serve as a ready source of evidence to establish these
issues.218 In addition, the testimony of the parties and witnesses is likely to
provide the most telling evidence of the intended legal status of the
defendant. Given the numerous sources for establishing proof of agency,
ownership, or control, the need to admit evidence of liability insurance in
any form would seldom be great.
215 See id. § 5366, at 458.
216 See id. § 5368, at 467.
217 See id. § 5366, at 458.
218 See id.
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In fact, the need to present such evidence unexpectedly at trial could be
almost completely eliminated by resolving these issues in pretrial
proceedings. Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 9
district courts are encouraged to expedite the disposition of cases through
use of pretrial conferences 220 and pretrial orders. 221 For example, a court
may require a pretrial conference to forumlate and simplify the issues222
and eliminate frivolous claims or defenses, 223 to obtain admissions of fact
and documents that will avoid unnecessary proof224 and cumulative
evidence, 225 to render rulings on the admissibility of evidence, 226 and to
compel the identification of witnesses and documents. 227 To this end, the
court may order the parties to supply pretrial briefs on specified issues, 228
or adopt special procedures for managing potentially difficult actions that
involve complex issues or unusual problems of proof.229 Parties who fail to
comply with such orders may be subject to appropriate sanctions. 23 0
Under Rule 16, therefore, parties intending to present insurance
evidence at trial may be required to disclose this fact before proceedings
commence. That party may then be directed to identify the purpose for
such evidence, its nature (either documentary or testimonial), and any other
evidence that will be offered on the issue. If the only evidence supporting
this issue is a liability insurance contract, for example, it may not
withstand a motion for summary judgment. If, however, there is other
relevant evidence, the issue may then be ripe for trial, but the opposing
party may seek to exclude the proof of insurance in a motion in limine.23 1
In many cases the court may find the insurance evidence "unnecessary" or
"cumulative," and so issue an advance ruling that it will not be admitted
219 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1). Promulgated in 1938, Rule 16 was amended in
1983 to "meet the challenges of modern litigation." Id. advisory committee's notes.
Finding case management under the old rule lacking, the Advisory Committee
proposed the amendment to "[s]harpenl] the preparation and presentation of
cases .... eliminate trial surprise, and improv[e], as well as facilitat[e], the settlement
process."Id. Among other things, the 1983 amendment required district courts to issue
scheduling orders in most cases, and expanded the courts' power to identify litigable
issues. Id.
220 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
221 Id. at (b).
222 Id. at (c)(1).
223 Id.
224 Id. at (c)(3).
225 Id. at (c)(4).
226 Id. at (c)(3).
227 Id. at (c)(5).
228 Id.
229 Id. at (c)(10).
230 Sd. at (.o.231 See 23 C. WRiGH-r & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5369, at 472-73.
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into evidence at trial. In the event the court elects to receive the evidence,
it can admonish counsel concerning the appropriate method for its
admission before the jury. When counsel fails to heed this directive, the
court may punish the transgressor by imposing sanctions. 23 2
A similar methodology could be employed in determining the
admissibility of insurance evidence for the purpose of establishing the bias
or interest of a witness. Under Rule 16, the parties may be required to
indicate before trial each of their witnesses and the subject of their
expected testimony. 233 Thus, long before any witness appears in the
courtroom, opposing counsel usually will know whether the witness is
employed by the defendant's insurance carrier, whether they have given a
prior statement to the insurer, or whether they have been retained by the
insurance company, which funds the defense, to testify for a fee at trial.
These are the common bases upon which plaintiff's counsel will attempt to
impeach the credibility of these witnesses. 234 The important factor in
establishing the bias or interest of these witnesses, however, is not so much
that they have had contact with the defendant's insurer, but that they may
have some allegiance to the "defense" side of the adversarial litigation
axis. 235 Accordingly, assuming the court determines in pretrial proceedings
that the witnesses may be impeached on this ground, counsel should be
instructed that they are only to inquire as to the witnesses' connection to
the "defense," and not to identify the defendant's insurer. 23 6
Besides the foregoing exceptions, evidence of insurance occasionally
has been introduced to juries either as an admission of liability by the
defendant or through an errant reference made by the witnesses or counsel.
Though these "exceptions" occur with much less frequency than those
discussed above, their incidence may also be drastically reduced with little
effort. An admission may contain a reference to insurance, such as: "Don't
worry. My insurance will pay off." In that case the relevance to the
question of the declarant's fault is tenuous at best, and often should not
survive the balancing process to admit evidence under Rule 403.237 Even
when it does, frequently the reference to insurance can be deleted without
232 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0. According to § (f) of Rule 16, the court may
impose such sanctions "as are just," including any permitted by FED. R. CIV. P.
37(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D), as well as the award of any attorney's fees incurred because
of noncompliance with the Rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0.
233 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(5); Brinkman v. Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 747 (5th
Cir. 1987).
234 See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, " 5367, at 459-60.
235 See O'Donnell v. Bachelor, 429 Pa. 498, 509, 240 A.2d 484, 489 (1968)
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
236 See Matthews v. Jean's Pastry Shop, 113 N.H. 546, 548, 311 A.2d 127, 129
(1973); O'Donnell, 429 Pa. at 509, 240 A.2d at 489 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
237 See Slough, supra, note 7, at 714.
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compromising the value of the admission. 23 8 As for errant references by
witnesses and counsel, these can be substantially reduced through a clear
admonition by the court prior to trial that such "lapses" will not be
tolerated,23 9 and could result in a finding of contempt.
In combination, the pre-emptive measures discussed above can go a
long way in eliminating some of the "impracticality" of implementing the
insurance exclusionary rule. With the availability of questionnaires and
alternative oral questioning techniques, there seems little need ever to
allow insurance references during voir dire. By requiring counsel to
identify their intended uses of insurance evidence before trial, the court can
reduce the amount of time spent during trial resolving these questions. At
the same time, the pretrial identification and review of such evidence will
likely result in the exclusion of much evidence that possesses little or no
probative value. In the event a relevant and necessary purpose is offered,
the court can limit counsel to stay within the scope of that purpose and can
delineate the precise manner in which the evidence can be admitted.
Ideally, then, this organized approach to the admission of insurance
evidence could expedite the clear presentation of the evidence and might
avoid the confusion that often results from extemporaneous and time-
consuming, in-court colloquia between the judge and counsel.
VI. PROSPECTS FOR ABANDONING THE RULE: CONTEMPORANEOUS
AND POST Hoc TECHNIQUES FOR SCRUTINIZING JURY
DELIBERATIONS FOR INSURANCE CONSIDERATIONS
Though of promising utility, the foregoing suggestions admittedly
contain a serious limitation. Even though they may substantially reduce the
likelihood that insurance will be mentioned before, and thus, considered by
juries, they cannot prevent such references entirely. This is especially true
during trial when there may be legitimate reasons for allowing such
references. Thus, even when all appropriate restrictive measures are taken,
there is a persistent risk that juries can become indoctrinated to the
existence of insurance during trial and that such indoctrination will
continue to influence verdicts.
This risk spawned the exclusionary rule in the first place, and has
sustained it for nearly a century. Such a rule has been necessary because
the judicial system afforded no means of determining whether insurance
indoctrination occured, and if so, whether and to what extent it affected the
decisionmaking process of juries. Because of this uncertainty, courts felt
constrained to grant mistrials and new trials whenever the rule was
238 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 7, § 194, at 585.
239 See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5369, at 473.
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transgressed, and insurance indoctrination became even a remote
possibility. If courts and parties were afforded some insight into the
deliberations of juries, however, such indoctrination could be detected or
even avoided, and the wastefulness of retrying cases on mere possibilities
alleviated. In turn, the need for the exclusionary rule itself would be
virtually eliminated. Because the risk of insurance indoctrination under any
approach is appreciable, and its effects significant, there seems adequate
justification for exploring this previously forbidden frontier.
This solution, however, also is not without complications. It appears to
run counter to a long standing policy of American jurisprudence-that of
keeping jury deliberations off limits to the outside world.240 But a closer
examination reveals that this conflict may be more ostensible than real.
Indeed, it is suggested below that the investigation of the jury deliberation
process may be accomplished, and the detection of prejudicial
indoctrination facilitated, without jeopardizing the policies that traditionally
have favored protecting the jury from such scrutiny.
A. Impediments to the Examination of Jury Deliberations
Before considering possible methods of jury supervision, it is
necessary to identify the present limitations inhibiting their implementation.
Federal law and procedure are illustrative for this purpose. On the federal
level, there are three barriers to the examination of jury deliberations. One,
which has been codified by statute, prevents direct observation of the
deliberative process itself; a second is embodied in local court rules and
limits post-trial contact with jurors; the last, as a rule of evidence,
generally excludes testimony by jurors concerning either the form or
content of their deliberations.
Prior to 1955, the policy of sheltering juries from outside influences
was so deeply ingrained in American legal tradition that few within the
legal community had ever considered recording actual jury deliberations. In
that year, however, the enterprising coordinators of the Chicago Jury
Project did just that. Receiving permission from both counsel and trial
judge, but not the jurors, the project coordinators recorded the
deliberations of juries in five federal cases tried in a district court in
Wichita, Kansas. 241 Despite extensive security measures, word of the
240 The history of this policy is recounted in Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury
Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of
Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C.L. REV. 509, 513-25 (1988), and Mueller, Jurors'
Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57
NEB. L. REv. 920, 922-35 (1978).
241 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 17, at vii.
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experiment eventually leaked to the press. 242 Shortly after its public
disclosure, the project was censured by the Attorney General of the United
States and a bill was introduced in Congress to prohibit further "jury-
tapping." 243 In 1956, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1508,244 which
imposed up to a $1000 fine and one year imprisonment2 45 for anyone who
"knowingly and willfully" 246 "records, or attempts to record"247 or "listens
to or observes, or attempts to listen to or observe, the proceedings of any
grand or petit jury of which he is not a member in any court of the United
States while such jury is deliberating or voting."248 Since the passage of
the federal act, which remains in force, at least thirty state jurisdictions
have adopted similar legislation. 249
Although the jury room door has thus been closed to outsiders, federal
law theoretically permits aggrieved parties to gain some insight into the
decisionmaking process of the jury through post-deliberative contact with
one or more of its members. 25 0 This right, however, has been so greatly
circumscribed that it is usually unavailable or unavailing. In many federal
jurisdictions, a party seeking to interview a juror following the rendition of
a verdict may only do so upon a preliminary showing of "good cause." 25 1
Ordinarily, such a showing requires some proof that one or more of the
jurors had engaged in misconduct or had been subject to improper
influences. 252 Since jurors cannot even be contacted until the good cause
standard is met, satisfaction of this preliminary burden presumably must
depend upon unsolicited revelations of jurors, chance remarks overheard
by a party, physical evidence of misconduct left in the jury room, or
testimony from nonjuror witnesses. 25 3
Even if this preliminary showing can be made, the party requesting a
juror interview may only do so in accordance with the local rules of the
242 Id.
243 Id. Later, excerpts of the deliberations were broadcast with the jurors'
permission on the Frontline documentary television series. J. GUINTHER, supra note
17, at 234 n.24.
244 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1956).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at (a).
248 Id. at (b).
249 J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 234 n.24; H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra
note 17, at vii.
250 See infra notes 251 & 258 and accompanying text.
251 Crump, supra note 240, at 527-28 & nn. 138, 140. Some jurisdictions require
no such showing and, in fact, set forth no standard for the trial judge to follow. Id. at
528 & n.139.252 Id. at 528.
253 Id.
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jurisdiction in which the case was tried. In most jurisdictions, a party
suspecting juror misconduct must so assert in a motion for new trial. 254
The decision to grant the movant a hearing is committed to the district
court's discretion, 25 5 as is the extent and manner of any investigation
permitted by the court.25 6 In the event a hearing is held, the movant bears
the burden of proving both that the misconduct occurred and that such
misconduct impaired the movant's ability to receive a fair trial.257
The evidence that the movant may present for this purpose is limited,
to say the least. Under Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
juror may only testify "on the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." 25 8
Jurors are prohibited, however, from giving testimony
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's
mind or emotions as influencing him to assent or to dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith. 259
According to Rule 606(b), neither the juror's "affidavit [n]or evidence of
any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be
precluded from testifying [may] be received" for the purpose of attempting
to impeach the verdict. 260
Whatever the general merit of these restrictions, 261 it appears that their
application to the insurance-reference dilemma deserves serious
254 See FED. R. Civ. P. 59; FED. R. CRIM. P. 33; Crump, supra note 240, at
531; Mueller, supra note 240, at 960-61. If, however, the evidence of misconduct
does not become known until after the time for filing new trial motions has passed, a
collateral attack upon the judgment usually will be permitted. Id. at 961.
255 Crump, supra note 240, at 531 & n.162.
256 Mueller, supra note 240, at 962-63 & n. 167.
257 Crump, supra note 240, at 531 & n.166.
258 FED. R. EviD. 606(b).
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Rule 606(b) and the local rules that implement it seem questionable in both
principle and practice. See Crump, supra note 240, at 535-42. As for the local rules
that permit postverdict interrogation of jurors only upon a preliminary showing of
"good cause," it is true that they may serve to deter frivolous attacks upon a verdict;
however, they may also prevent many others which may have substance. Because
investigation of the jurors themselves is prohibited, the movant is denied access to the
primary sources of evidence necessary to satisfy this burden. Parties unable to
overcome this tautology are effectively denied an opportunity to be heard on the
matter. Even if this result were justified by the screening function served by the good
1226 [Vol. 52:1177
INSURANCE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
reconsideration.262 Much effort is expended currently to prevent jurors
from being exposed to and influenced by insurance references at every
stage of litigation. But even when such references have been minimized,
and the jury carefully instructed concerning the boundaries of their fact
finding mission, it is still possible that the presumed existence of insurance
can play a role in the jury's determination. Indeed, it now appears that of
those jurors who consider the fact of insurance in their deliberations, many
may not be indoctrinated to the existence of insurance exclusively during
the litigation process, but actually come to court with that assumption. 263
cause requirement, it is difficult to justify the arbitrary manner in which it is achieved.
The ability to meet this standard depends not upon the skill of counsel or the strength
of her argument, but upon the luck and happenstance necessary for obtaining evidence
to support it. Indeed, only an eavesdropped conversation or fortuitously discovered
witness separates the movant who may pursue a claim of misconduct, and the one who
may not.
Even if this burden is met, Rule 606(b) normally will preclude the type of
evidence necessary to impeach the verdict and acquire a new trial-that is, testimony
from the jurors themselves concerning the nature of the misconduct and its effect, if
any, upon the verdict. Allowing only evidence of extraneous information or outside
influences, this rule prohibits any reference to other improper matters likely to infect
the decisionmaking process of the jury. For example, under Rule 606(b), a juror could
not testify that other members of the panel were sleeping or abusing drugs or alcohol
during the proceedings, see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987); that she
was pressured to vote with the majority by other jurors, see Mueller, supra note 240,
at 937-38 & n.74; that she or other jurors ignored or misunderstood the law, id. at
936 & n.65; that racial prejudices influenced the verdict or were even discussed, see
Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472,
1595 & n.1 (1988) (citing cases); or, most importantly for this discussion, that one or
more of the jurors speculated upon the existence of insurance and its impact upon the
judgment, see infra note 262. Nevertheless, the same juror would be permitted to
testify to such comparatively innocuous matters as the unauthorized viewing of a
premises, or the discovery and consideration of books, newspapers, and magazines
even marginally related to the trial. See Mueller, supra note 240, at 946 & n. 107-08.
An example on this latter point demonstrates the capricious way in which the rule
operates. Though a court would be permitted to receive testimony that a juror
discovered and disseminated among the panel a magazine article discussing generally
the insurance crisis and its impact on modem litigation, it would be prohibited from
considering evidence that another juror had come to court with a preconception that
the defendant was insured, and, on the basis of this assumption, had vigorously
attempted to persuade the panel to return a high award against that party.
262 The few federal jurisdictions that have addressed the question have applied the
exclusionary principles of Rule 606(b) to prevent jurors from testifying about the
discussion of insurance. See Holden v. Porter, 405 F.2d 878, 879 (10th Cir. 1969);
Farmers Co-Op Elev. Ass'n v. Strand, 382 F.2d 224, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1014 (1967); Annotation, Discussion, During Jury Deliberation, of Possible
Insurance Coverage as Prejudicial Misconduct, 47 A.L.R.3d 1299, 1305-11 (1973).
263 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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In this way, the specter of insurance is even more insidious than other
pieces of improper evidence that are openly admitted by the trial court, or
are otherwise made known to the jury. Given the propensity of insurance
questions to influence determinations of both liability and damages, the
need to monitor it is even greater.
B. Possible Solutions
There are at least three carefully tailored procedures that the trial court
might undertake to check the propriety of the deliberation process. All
three approaches probably are more intrusive into the decisionmaking
process of the jury than would be permitted in most jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, each approach markedly facilitates the detection of prejudice
caused by the topic of insurance and still satisfies the policies animating the
rule against impeaching jury verdicts.
1. The Use of Juror Affidavits
The least intrusive method of preventing and detecting the
consideration of insurance is for the trial court to issue to the jury prior to
deliberations an affidavit form or forms to be signed by each juror and
returned to the trial judge along with the verdict. The affidavit could
provide as follows:
I [we] hereby attest that the verdict which I [we] have rendered in the
above captioned case is premised solely upon the law as explained by the
judge and the facts established at trial, and is not to any degree based upon
the identity or status of the parties or their respective abilities to pay for
the loss sustained in this case.264
If each juror signs the affidavit, it would be presumed that the verdict was
not based on insurance considerations and counsel would be precluded
from any further investigation into the deliberative process of the jury. If,
however, one or more of the jurors fails to endorse the affidavit, the court
might conduct a limited inquiry to determine the reason for the omission.
Should this interrogation reveal that the existence of insurance was
discussed by the jury during deliberations, the court might then expand the
scope of the colloquy to determine the nature and extent of any such
reference.
264 Direct reference to "insurance" was avoided in order to reduce the likelihood
of indoctrination from the affidavit. Nevertheless, because the affidavit may itself
serve to discourage the jurors from considering those topics to which it refers,
inclusion of such a reference may not be harmful, and may even be appropriate.
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Of the three proposals contained in this Article, this one comes the
closest to satisfying both the letter and spirit of Rule 606(b). Under its
terms, Rule 606(b) appears to prohibit the revelation of matters that were
involved in the formulation of the jury's verdict; it does not seem to apply
to those that were not. The proposed affidavit seeks information within the
latter category. It attempts not to divine the considerations that motivated
the verdict, but only to ensure that the topic of insurance was not one of
them. Only when the affidavit is returned unsigned would further
investigation of the surrounding circumstances be warranted. Even then,
the inquiry would be conducted by the court and would be limited to the
reasons for this omission.
Whether permitted by the strict language of Rule 606(b), this
procedure does not appear to threaten the policy goals which inspired it.
The exclusionary principle of Rule 606(b) is premised upon four basic
notions: first, that it is necessary to prevent jurors from being harassed by
the losing party who seeks grounds for reversal; second, that it prevents
the chilling effect that would occur if the jury's private deliberations were
subject to public scrutiny; third, that allowing unrestricted attacks by jurors
upon verdicts would undermine the finality of judgments, thus draining the
resources of the judicial system and undermining its integrity; and fourth,
that jury tampering would result if attorneys were permitted to interview
jurors for possible misconduct during deliberations. 265
Because the jury is not made to testify specifically to the circumstances
surrounding its deliberation, there seems little chance that the affidavit will
deter open discussion in the jury room. If anything, it may expedite the
deliberations by keeping the panel focused on relevant issues. Any
"chilling" effect would likely concern the consideration of only improper
topics such as the financial resources of the parties or the existence of
insurance coverage. Given this effect, few affidavits would be returned
unendorsed, and the need for direct post-deliberation contact with the jury
would be rare. As a result, the finality of verdicts would remain largely
unaffected, and the opportunity for jury tampering or juror harassment
remote. Indeed, in the event a juror failed or refused to sign the affidavit,
265 See Crump, supra note 240, at 532-35; Mueller, supra note 240, at 923-24 &
nn.7-1 1. With respect to the policies against jury tampering and harassment, the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which the
lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make comments to
a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror
or to influence his actions in future jury service.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108(D) (1980).
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further investigation of the matter would not be conducted by counsel, but
would be limited to the trial judge, who would have wide discretion in this
regard.
While this tactic may seem Orwellian, it possesses several advantages
over current practice. Like the standardized juror questionnaire discussed
previously, 266 the affidavit is likely to make the deliberation process more
pointed and thus more efficient. In turn, by requiring all jurors to attest to
the propriety of the verdict by applying their signatures to the affidavit, the
seriousness of the process will be brought home to the panel. The result
should be more thoughtful and focused consideration of relevant issues and
evidence. Indeed, it seems unlikely that a juror would deliberately
misrepresent the truth by signing an affidavit under penalty of perjury.
Admittedly, the above approach is not perfect. It is possible that some
panels either will not read the affidavit carefully or will not take the
document seriously, thus returning it to open court as a matter of course
completely endorsed, but without any increased reflection. Under such a
scenario, any further inquiry into the verdict would be precluded, and the
court and counsel would have no greater insight into the thought process of
the jury, or the possible prejudicial injection of insurance considerations. If
the dereliction among jurors has risen to this level, however, it would be
questionable whether the jury system should be maintained as a fair means
of resolving disputes. If so, it would seem to require much stricter
supervision than the procedure suggested above.
2. Post-Deliberation Interrogation
Greater supervision might be provided under the second alternative
procedure for the investigation of insurance biases in jury verdicts. Rather
than asking the jury to sign affidavits, counsel might be permitted to move
following the verdict to have the jury foreperson questioned to determine
whether the topic of insurance was discussed during deliberations. The
motion could be made orally or in writing, but must be raised prior to the
jury's discharge. Only the judge would be permitted to conduct the
inquiry.
In ruling on the motion, the court should consider whether the jurors'
attitudes towards and connections with the insurance industry have been
thoroughly investigated in pretrial questionnaires, as recommended herein,
or, less likely, during voir dire. The court might also consider the type of
case involved (is it one in which most people would expect insurance
coverage?- i.e., automobile accident cases), the community in which the
case was tried and the experience of its members with insurance issues, the
266 See supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
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nature and extent of any insurance references to which the jury was
exposed during the course of litigation, and the legitimacy of the verdict in
view of the evidence presented. 267
If, after reviewing these factors, the court denies the motion, no further
inquiry could be made into the jury's deliberations or the propriety of the
verdict. In the event of an appeal from the trial judge's refusal, an appellate
court could only reverse the court's decision for an abuse of discretion, and
would rely for this determination upon a review of the considerations
described above. Should the trial court grant the motion, it might then
inquire of the jury foreperson whether the topic had been discussed during
deliberations, and if so, what was said. The court would not be permitted
to ask the jurors whether, or to what extent, the issue of insurance affected
their verdict.
In most instances the interrogation will likely reveal no discussion of
insurance and the matter will be ended. When such a discussion has
occurred, counsel may submit a motion for a new trial on this basis. The
grant or denial of such a motion will then depend upon the nature and
extent of the reference within the context of the deliberative process of the
jury.268
Despite the initial evaluation of the motion conducted by the court, the
recommended approach still might entail eliciting testimony from a juror
concerning an event that occurred during deliberations. Thus, under Rule
606(b), the above procedure would probably be prohibited in the federal
judicial system. 269 It would not, however, violate procedural rules in many
state jurisdictions that have adopted Rule 606(b) or have developed their
own counterpart. 270 In these jurisdictions, courts have interpreted the "no
impeachment" rule to allow jurors to disclose statements made during
267 Many of these same factors are presently considered by courts in deciding
whether to permit insurance questions during voir dire. See Annotation, supra note 2,
§ 16, at 798-802.
268 Courts that have had cause to consider the prejudice resulting from the
discussion of insurance during jury deliberations seem to have relied upon the
following factors: The nature and extent of the discussion (i.e., was it casually or
deliberately considered); the point in the deliberations at which the discussion
occurred (i.e., whether the discussion occurred before or after the verdict was
reached); and any censure or rebuke by a fellow juror following the discussion. See
Annotation, supra note 262, § 2[a], at 1303-04.
269 See FED. R. EvID. 606(b) ("[A] juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations .... ").
270 States that have adopted their own versions of Rule 606(b) include Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Mueller,
supra note 240, at 921 n.2, 934 & nn.55-58.
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
deliberations, though not the impact that these may have had upon the
decisionmaking process of the jury.271
No matter how the letter of 606(b) is interpreted, one thing is fairly
certain: the colloquy between the judge and jury foreperson would not
seem to violate in any meaningful way the policies underlying that rule. By
delegating to the court the sole right to question the jury, counsel are
afforded no opportunity to either harass or tamper with the jurors.
Moreover, because the party making the motion must first show some basis
for invoking this procedure, the finality of most judgments will remain
undisturbed. When this burden is met, and the colloquy is permitted, the
scope of the interrogation will be limited to the nature of any insurance
references, and will not inquire into their impact, if any, upon the verdict.
Given the limited nature of this procedure, no chilling effect upon the
jury's deliberations is likely to result from the interrogation. If anything,
only a discussion of the impermissible topic of insurance would be
deterred. In the unusual case when such a discussion is disclosed, both the
trial and appellate courts would have a far better perspective from which to
assess the prejudicial effect of this discussion upon the jury's deliberations.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that to permit investigation of jury
deliberations is to remove the lid from Pandora's box. Instead of aiding the
administration of the judicial system, some may say that such a procedure
will invite additional motions and appeals by litigants dissatisfied by the
outcome of litigation. This fear, however, is not justified.
The recommended approach would change current practice in two
ways: first, a party wishing to file a new trial motion on the basis of an
erroneously admitted insurance question would first be required to invoke
the questioning procedure outlined above and second, in later deciding the
new trial motion, the court will have the benefit of the additional
information gained during the colloquy with the jury foreperson. Besides
the additional time the court would spend conducting such colloquies, the
burden placed upon the district courts by this procedure seems to be
minimal. Because the questioning process is just as likely to reveal no
271 This approach has been termed the "Iowa rule" because it was first adopted
by the Iowa Supreme Court in Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195
(1866). Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin all had at one time adopted the Iowa
rule. See Crump, supra note 240, at 516 n.51. After the passage of Rule 606(b),
however, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin abandoned the Iowa rule in
favor of Rule 606(b). Id.
The original Advisory Committee drafts of Rule 606(b) had endorsed the Iowa
rule. See FED. R. EviD. 606(b) historical note. This approach also originally was
favored by the United States House of Representatives. See Mueller, supra note 240,
at 930. However, the Senate amended the House version, and Rule 606(b) was enacted
in its present form. Id.
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prejudicial discussion of insurance as it is to uncover such an illicit
consideration, the adoption of the recommended procedure is not likely to
encourage parties to file more new trial motions or raise additional grounds
for error when they do. In fact, the additional procedure may have just the
opposite effect. When the trial court conducts the inquiry of the jury
foreperson and no insurance discussion is revealed, there would be no good
faith basis for pursuing this issue in a motion for new trial. 272 In any case,
the determination of prejudice under this procedure would still be
committed to the discretion of the trial court.
The impact of this procedure upon the workload of the appellate bench
probably would be no more onerous. At worst, it might precipitate three
types of alleged errors, none of which are likely to be appreciable in
number or difficult to resolve. For example, when the trial court refuses to
conduct the requested interrogation, a claim of error may ensue. In this
situation, however, the trial court's decision is based upon the same
discretionary factors as those now used to decide motions for new trial
involving the erroneous admission of insurance evidence. 273 In reviewing
either decision, the appellate court is faced with a single question: Was
there sufficient basis for the trial court to believe that the introduction of
insurance references had a prejudicial indoctrinating impact upon the jury?
If answered in the negative, the movant is entitled neither to a post-
deliberation examination of the jury foreperson under the proposed
approach, nor to a new trial under current practice. Regardless of the
means by which this issue is raised, it is subject to the same "abuse of
discretion" review currently undertaken by the appellate court.
A second ground for error might arise if the court agrees to conduct
the questioning, but then does a less than thorough job. Like the
administration of voir dire, however, the scope and manner of such
questioning would be committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and the exercise of that discretion is infrequently disturbed by the appellate
bench. In any event, the basis for such a claim could be almost entirely
eliminated if the trial court encourages and receives input from the parties
on the form of the questions asked.
The final claim of error might arise when the trial court conducts the
post-deliberation examination of the foreperson, but nevertheless decides
the issue of prejudice unfavorably in the motion for new trial. The
appellate court's review in this situation would be identical to current
practice except in one major respect-the court would possess much more
272 Accordingly, such a motion may be subject to sanctions under FED. R. CIV.
P. 11.
273 See supra notes 69-72; see also Annotation, supra note 2, § 16, 798-802.
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information than is currently provided concerning the thought process of
the jury and the injection into that process of any improper considerations.
Far from jeopardizing the integrity of the jury system, the proposed
procedure promises to make the decisional process more accountable and
thus more fair. It gives the court the ability to ensure that impermissible
factors such as the existence of insurance do not play a significant role in
that process. In this way, it may help clear up uncertainty in this area,
since no longer will courts have to engage in the speculation that review of
this issue has required. As a result, the proposed procedure may actually
serve to streamline both the post-trial and appellate process in this area.
3. Recording Jury Deliberations
The third and final proposed procedure for detecting insurance
indoctrination is the use of recording devices in the jury room. 274 Because
of the general prohibition against recording jury deliberations, this
approach is not susceptible to immediate implementation. Thus, like the
use of juror interviews discussed above, it is offered merely as an ideal
model.
The need for such a model is demonstrated by the untoward legacy
perpetuated by the current policy of deliberative isolation. By locking the
jury room door to behavioral scientists, this policy has precluded
meaningful investigation and improvement of the primary form of dispute
resolution used in this country. At the same time, it has blinded the judicial
system to the decisionmaking processes of juries, forcing courts to decide
cases upon nothing more than the speculation of what might have happened
in the jury room.
This has been especially apparent, and troubling, in the handling of
insurance questions. Because of the prohibition against recording jury
deliberations, there presently is no way to determine whether the mention
of insurance before juries has any effect upon their consideration and
disposition of civil cases. If these deliberations were subject to the looking
glass of technology, however, there is reason to believe that the chimera of
insurance indoctrination could be eliminated.
No doubt, permitting the recordation and review of entire jury
deliberations would have ramifications far exceeding those suggested
above. Indeed, to make a record of these proceedings would mean to
274 Such devices could include either videotape or audiotape equipment.
Obviously, videotaping deliberations would be more obtrusive than merely making an
audio record; however, the videotape would provide a more complete picture of the
deliberative process. It is not necessary for this discussion to select one alternative
over the other. Either method would facilitate the detection of insurance
considerations, and so would be preferable to current practice.
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subject them to scrutiny for all their ills-not just the occasional discussion
of insurance. Once the inner sanctum had been penetrated by the eyes and
ears of technology, the broad insight that they have to offer could not be
ignored. Just what the full impact of this procedure may be is beyond the
scope of this paper and is better left to those more knowledgeable.
Nevertheless, this Article generally embraces the idea of recording jury
deliberations, and suggests below how this procedure can help resolve the
insurance question dilemma without undermining the jury system as we
know it.
The recommended "procedure" would begin during the trial judge's
instructions to the jury. After charging the jury on the law and the
constraints of their fact finding mission (including an instruction that the
ability of the parties to pay for the loss sustained is not a legitimate
consideration), the judge should inform the jury that its deliberations will
be recorded. In addition, the judge should disclose the location of the
recording device and explain that the recording will not be monitored by
the judge or attorneys but only by a court officer (bailiff, clerk) to ensure
no mechanical difficulties. Further, the instruction should explain the
purpose of the device: to promote fairness and efficiency in the system by
ensuring that the jury follows the instructions of the court and does not get
side tracked on irrelevant issues. Finally, the judge would tell the jurors
that the tape recordings eventually would be viewed only by the judge(s)
and attorneys handling the case, and would be kept from the public unless
the jurors agreed otherwise.
Inside the jury room the recording device should be positioned in a
conspicuous location so the jury will not waste time attempting to find it.
By the same token, its location should not be distracting. Positioning the
camera or microphone in a ceiling corner, as is done in banks and
convenience stores, would probably suffice for this purpose. Once the
jurors enter the jury room, the devices can be activated by the officer
monitoring the recording and shut off when they depart.
After the conclusion of the trial, the court would retain the original
recording of the deliberations and could order it sealed from public
disclosure.275 Copies of the tape would be forwarded to the attorneys for
275 There seems to be ample precedent for courts to deny public access to the
deliberation tapes. Although the public has a right of access to judicial records, see
generally Annotation, Public Access to Records and Proceedings of Civil Actions in
Federal District Courts, 96 A.L.R. FED. 769 (1990) (surveying federal cases
considering the scope of this right with respect to various court records), it is
questionable whether the tapes would automatically become part of the official court
record. Because jury deliberations traditionally have not been subject to public
scrutiny, the public would enjoy no special right of access to the deliberation tapes.
United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1983). The tapes might
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review in preparation of new trial motions. If, upon review of the tape,
counsel allege that insurance was considered during the deliberations, this
allegation must be asserted in post-trial motions, specifically identifying the
misconduct and where it is reflected on the tape. Failure to object to this
specific form of misconduct in post-trial motions would waive any future
objection to it, unless the prejudice therefrom is manifest 276
The trial court would decide the motions on the basis of the tape and
any other circumstances presently permitted under the law. As always, this
only become part of the official court record if the court is called upon, by motion, to
review the tape for'error and reduce its findings in an order or opinion. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 898-901 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Even if the tapes are included in the record, the public's right to see them is not
absolute. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). This
right could still be restricted upon a showing of an over-riding governmental interest
in keeping the tapes free from public scrutiny. Annotation, supra, § 2 (and cases cited
therein). Such a showing should not be difficult, since the current prohibition against
recording deliberations is premised upon a strong governmental interest in protecting
jurors from post-verdict harassment and preserving the integrity of the judicial system.
See text accompanying notes 265 & 281.
There presently are numerous situations in which the public's access to court
proceedings and records may be restricted. A court may issue a pretrial order
precluding counsel, the parties, or witnesses from discussing a pending case. See
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Federal Court's Pretrial Order Precluding
Publicity or Comment About Pending Case by Counsel, Parties, or Witnesses, 5
A.L.R. FED. 948 (1970) (collecting cases). Likewise, it may seal discovery material
upon a showing of good cause that it involves trade secrets or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(6),(7),(8).
A court may also place restraints upon post-verdict communication between news
media and jurors in federal cases. See Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1114 (juror refused
press interview, the court's order forbidding future requests for interviews concerning
the vote of the jury was properly within its discretion, since the press enjoyed no
special right of access to matters not available to the general public, such as jury
deliberations); see also United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987)
(issuing order deferring release of jurors' names and addresses for seven days after
return of verdict); United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ind. 1982)
(issuing order prohibiting juror interviews on premises of courthouse). The records in
both adoption proceedings and cases involving trade secrets are often completely
exempt from public disclosure. See Annotation, Restricting Access to Judicial Records
of Concluded Adoption Proceedings, 83 A.L.R.3d 800 (1978); Annotation, In Camera
Trial or Hearing and Other Procedures to Safeguard Trade Secrets or the Like Against
Undue Disclosure in Course of Civil Action Involving Such Secret, 62 A.L.R.2d 509
(1958).
276 See Shepler v. Crucible Fuel Co., 140 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1944) (quoting
Arkansas Bridge Co. v. Kelly-Atkinson Constr. Co., 282 F. 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1922))
("The law requires that errors, to be reviewable, must have been definitely and timely
called to the attention of the trial court, in order to afford that court a fair opportunity
to pass upon the matter, and correct its own errors, if any.").
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determination will rest upon the sound discretion of the trial court. In the
event of an appeal from an adverse ruling, the trial court's original tape
recording, along with the rest of the record, would be sent to the appellate
court. In reviewing such a decision, the appellate court would continue to
apply the "effect upon the judgment" test for determining whether the
discussion of insurance constituted grounds for a new trial.
When the case finally reaches its ultimate conclusion, the original tape
would be stored with the case file as under current procedure. Parties
would be required to return the tapes and be prohibited from making
duplications. Although this could be enforced through sanctions, 277 the
temptation may precipitate more transgressions than would be acceptable.
As an alternative, counsel desiring the tape could be required to purchase
their copy from the court to defray the expense of administering the
system. Unless consent is obtained from the jurors, 278 counsel could be
ordered to prevent further duplication or distribution of the tape except for
in-house, professional, educational purposes. 279
Although the federal government and many state jurisdictions prohibit
the use of recording devices in the jury room, the policies underlying the
prohibition do not seem threatened by this procedure. 280 The clearest
exposition of these policies is contained in the rather sparse legislative
history to 18 U.S.C. § 1508,281 the federal statute banning the recordation
of federal jury deliberations. In a letter sent to the Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee by then Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers,
who favored the statute, Rogers stated:
277 A party who disobeys an order of court may be held in contempt. See
Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 425 F.2d 1111, 1113 (3d Cir. 1970), modified on other
grounds, 454 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1972).
278 Though there is no clear documentation, it appears that the censure of the
directors of the Chicago jury project and the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1956)
were caused, in part, by the failure of the project directors to obtain the consent of the
jurors whose deliberations they recorded.
279 See Gentron Corp. v. H.C. Johnson Agencies, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 415, 418-19
(D. Wis. 1978) (pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), court ordered sequestration of
discovery documents except for release to plaintiffs employees, attorneys, or
experts).
280 Neither is there any conflict between the primary objectives of Rule 606(b)
and the proposed use of recording devices in the jury room. Because a record of the
deliberations would be made as they occurred, implementation of this idea would
obviate the need for future contact with the jury. This, in turn, would eliminate the
prospect of jury harassment and tampering.
281 See H.R. Rep. No. 2807, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, reprinted in 1956 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4149.
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Such practices, however well intentioned, obviously and inevitably stifle
the discussion and free exchange of ideas among jurors. They tend to
destroy the very basis for common judgment among the jurors, upon
which the institution of trial by jury is based, and are inconsistent with the
purposes of the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which requires that trial by jury shall be preserved. 282
As this correspondence reveals, the legislation appears to have been
initiated with one purpose in mind: to protect the open and robust
discussion of issues in the jury room, and so preserve the integrity of the
civil jury system as a whole. Although not a specified objective, it also
seems apparent that this prohibition was intended to conserve the resources
of the judicial system by protecting the finality of judgments from later
attack. Though the recordation of jury deliberations may appear to offend
these policies, this is less than clear. A further examination reveals, in fact,
that it may promote fairness and efficiency in our judicial system.
Admittedly, except for seating the judge in the jury room, it would be
hard to have any closer, more direct scrutiny of the jurors than by
installing a recording device. Yet it does not necessarily follow that such
intensive examination of the deliberation process will inhibit jurors from
openly expressing themselves in the jury room. Attempts can and should be
made to reduce the inhibiting effect of such scrutiny. As noted above, some
of these would include informing the jury of the purpose and location of
the device, and situating it in an area that is not too obtrusive or
distracting. This approach has been used with success in jury studies that
have employed recording devices to examine the deliberative process of
mock juries.283  Prohibiting the judge and attorneys from
contemporaneously monitoring the tape should also help prevent any
chilling effect, as would secluding the tape from general public scrutiny.
Even if all of these steps are followed, however, it is still possible that
the "presence" of the device could influence the behavior of the jury. The
critical question, and one that is not susceptible to a definite answer, is
whether this influence will be positive or negative. The assumption
underlying the state and federal prohibitory statutes is that it will be
negative-that is, jurors will be discouraged from discussing legitimate
concerns or interacting in an appropriate manner. It is, however, just as
likely, perhaps more so, that jurors would censor only considerations that
2 82 id. at 3, reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4151.
283 See, e.g., HASTIE STUDY, supra note 17, at 51. ("A small television camera
was positioned in one corner of the room out of the direct sight of the jurors. They
were instructed that a recording would be made of their activities during
deliberation.").
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are irrelevant to the issues in the case as explained to them by the judge's
instructions.
This conclusion seems to be supported by the available research on the
subject.2 84 Perhaps the most comprehensive study of jury deliberations was
conducted by Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod, and Nancy Pennington.2 85 Their
findings are documented in their book, Inside the Jury.28 6 To enhance the
authenticity of the project, the authors attempted as much as possible to
simulate the experiences of actual juries. To this end, subjects participating
in the study were recruited from jury pools in three counties in
Massachusetts, were subjected to a brief voir dire, and were seated in an
actual courtroom where they were shown a videotaped re-enactment of an
actual homicide trial.287 After viewing the tape, which included
instructions by a judge, the juries were taken to an adjoining deliberation
room and were then informed that their deliberations would be recorded.2 88
The resulting deliberations were evaluated on a variety of bases,
including breadth and relevance.2 89 To measure the breadth of the
284 Only a few studies have recorded and analyzed live mock jury deliberations.
See, e.g., HAsTIE STUDY, supra note 17; Kessler, Social Psychology, supra note 17,
at 73 (discussing Forston, The Decision-Making Process in the American Civil Jury: A
Comparative Methodological Investigation (1968) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Minnesota); James & Simon, Status and Competence of Jurors, 69 Am. J. Soc. 563-
70 (1959); Kessler, A Content Analytic Comparison of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury
Decision-Making Processes (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan)).
285 See HASTIE STUDY, supra note 17.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 45-46.
288 Id. at 51.
289 To properly analyze these factors, an intricate methodology was developed
and employed by the authors:
The study's classification scheme was designed to capture the major events
that were relevant to the jury's explicit information-processing task. The heart of
the scheme was a system to code verbal references to evidence, the law, and
statements of the relationships between the evidence and the law.
Each jury deliberation was coded by one of two coders, working directly
with the videotapes, who scored each "utterance" into four kinds of categories.
Category one identified each speaker by seat number (1 to 12). Categories two
and three identified the content of each utterance with reference to the trial facts
(evidence or testimony) and the legal issues (judge's instructions) that should be
central to the jury's task of rendering a verdict. Category four indicated the type
of each remark. Remarks were classified as conveying information (assertion),
asking for information (question), or urging the group to take action as in a vote
(direction). Special codes were used to indicate events such as balloting, requests
for further instructions from the court, and declarations of deadlocking. For a
given event in deliberation, the speakers, the facts, the legal issues, and the
remark types identified the verbal activity, discussion, or procedural activity, such
as receiving further instructions from the trial judge, that was occurring. Thus, the
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deliberations, the authors relied upon two indices: the total number of
different facts alluded to by the jury members (out of a possible forty-
three) and the total number of key fact citations (out of a possible
fifteen).290 They found that the average jury considered about eighty-five
percent of the relevant material. 291 Conversely, the results indicated that
irrelevant remarks occurred "at a negligibly low rate (about one percent of
total speaking entries)."292 Equally insignificant were the juries'
considerations of evidence that the judge had instructed was inadmissible.
According to the authors, the juries that were studied routinely followed
the court's instructions to disregard irrelevant evidence. 293 And when
jurors attempted to discuss such matters, they were usually blocked by
other jurors.294
From these findings, it appears that the presence of the recording
devices in the jury room had little impact upon the legitimate aspects of the
jury's deliberations. Besides considering a high percentage of relevant
facts, the juries studied also entertained other matters usually considered
important to the fact finding mission. These included discussions of the
standard of proof, the credibility of the witnesses, and the judge's
instructions. 295 In this regard, the authors observed that "Ithe volume of
remarks contributed by individual jurors showed considerable variation
across jurors. " 296
The recording devices appear to have had more of an effect upon the
juries' consideration of irrelevant and improper matters. Although the
findings seem to suggest a virtual absence of jury misconduct during
deliberations, the authors cautioned that "it would be unwise to generalize
from these observations to actual jury behavior." 297 For example, it was
basic unit for an analysis of deliberation content was the four-variable, speaker-
fact-issue-type entry.
Id. at 54.
290 Id. at 85.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 89.
293 Id. at 87, 231.
294 Id.
295 See id. at 83-87 & tables 5.1, 5.2.
296 Id. at 98. Although the authors observed that "[miost juries included a few
members who did not participate in oral discussion at all," id., this finding was not
attributed to the presence of the recording devices in the deliberation room. Rather,
the authors concluded that such participation levels were caused "by a combination of
factors, including individual differences in talkativeness, a dominance hierarchy within
the group, and social conventions concerning polite debate." Id. at 92. Noting that
these jurors often were members of large factions, it was also posited that "they found
their points of view being expressed by other jurors." Id.
297 Id. at 23 1.
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noted that, contrary to the results obtained in the instant study, a
considerable body of research has demonstrated consistently that jurors are
unable to disregard "biasing extralegal testimony." 298 In explaining this
discrepancy, the authors concluded that the experimental juries in the
present study may have been abnormally well behaved when dealing with
the inadmissibility issue because they were aware that their deliberations
were being observed by social scientists. 299 This "good behavior"
syndrome was also credited for inhibiting irrelevant remarks generally
among the jury members. 3°°
These findings fail to justify the exclusion of recording devices from
the jury room. According to the Hastie study, the presence of recording
equipment seemed to facilitate rather than stifle the discussion and free
exchange of ideas among jurors. Indeed, if the introduction of such
technology had any effect at all, it appears to have impeded the
consideration of only impermissible matters. In this way, the use of
recording devices may actually make the jury system more credible, thus
promoting, rather than undermining, the fair trial guarantees of the seventh
amendment.
To have this salutary effect, however, it appears necessary that the
jurors be able to discriminate between permissible and impermissible
behavior in the jury room. They must be told not only what they may
consider, but what they may not, so they can guide their deliberative
behavior accordingly. Under current practice, such a candid approach may
have serious side effects, such as confusing the jury or enticing them to
dwell only on the forbidden areas of discussion. Recording the jury's
deliberations, however, may free the court from this concern. The presence
of the recording device in the jury room not only would detect any such
undesirable effects, but, because of its inhibiting impact on improper
conduct, should serve to prevent them from playing a role in the jury's
decision. This would prove especially auspicious in the insurance question
context in which proponents of the rule prohibiting insurance references
have complained that such references distract jurors and influence their
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 43, 87, 89; J. GUINTHER, supra note 17, at 85. This syndrome is not
unique to jury dynamics; rather, it may be exhibited in a variety of common life
experiences. Consider a simple hypothetical. Suppose two individuals are driving
down the same highway with a posted speed limit of 55 m.p.h. One is traveling 55
m.p.h., the other 75 m.p.h. Along the side of the road is a police car with a radar gun
conspicuously mounted on the door. Upon seeing the police car, the motorist traveling
55 m.p.h. is unlikely to alter her behavior since it is in compliance with the law.
However, the driver exceeding the speed limit is bound to apply the brakes as quickly
and firmly as possible. Even if the speeder falls to observe the police car, the other
motorist is likely to signal to her that she needs to reduce her speed.
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deliberations. The instant approach might allow courts to eliminate the
rule, discuss the role of insurance openly in the courtroom, and still protect
parties from the possible prejudicial effect of these references.
Determining the impact of such recording devices upon the behavior of
the jury is also important for assessing the strength of the other policy
argument against their use. It is the notion that we should not look too
closely at jury deliberations, because we may not like what we find. And
once we find what we do not like, it will cost far too much time, effort,
and money to make it right. While that may be true, we have no way of
knowing for sure unless we look. By looking with the help of modern
technology, we might find that the technology itself may solve part of the
problem.
The fear that too much scrutiny of jury behavior will result in an
avalanche of motions, appeals, and retrials is founded on a mistrust of
counsel, of jurors, or of the system itself. If it is believed that counsel will
abuse this procedure by making frivolous motions based upon trivial
defects in the deliberation process, this type of concern is not novel, for it
exists for any procedural device available for strategic use.30 1 The system
can and has attempted to curb such behavior, with varying degrees of
success, through sanctions or disciplinary action.302 When the alleged jury
misconduct is real, as would be evinced by the tape, the integrity of the
whole system benefits from correcting the wrong, regardless of the cost of
doing so. If it is feared that jurors are so corrupt or so incompetent that the
"real" instances of misconduct would be too numerous and thus too taxing
on the system to correct, a concern which the Hastie study seems to refute,
then perhaps the system needs to be discarded or changed. One way of
doing so would be to scrutinize the decisionmaking process of juries
through use of recording devices. If this technology were employed, the
rampant misconduct that is presently feared may not just be detected, it
might be inhibited and eliminated. As a result, the bases for motions,
appeals, and retrials may actually be reduced, and the burden to the whole
system alleviated. For cases where illicit considerations are detected by the
recording, the insight offered to the court by this technology will not only
301 Indeed, it was the rampant abuse of discovery tactics which led to
amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1980 and 1983. 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 4 (Supp. 1991). One
of the 1983 amendments was made to Rule 11, broadening the availability of sanctions
for just such abuses. 5A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1331, at 17-19 (2d ed. 1990). Since its amendment, Rule 11 itself has
been subject to so much overuse, if not misuse, that many in the legal community are
now calling for its revision. See Gibbons, Revisions of Rule 11 Are Urged, NAT'L
L.J., July 29, 1991, at 21.302 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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expedite the appellate review process, but it will make the ultimate
disposition of cases more fair.
As novel as this procedure may appear, its advent may be facilitated,
or indeed, foreshadowed by recent developments in both state and federal
court systems. In the last decade, courts have shown an increased
willingness to allow electronic technology into th--c-ourtroom. 303 Forty-
four states now permit television cameras to videotape court
proceedings. 30 4 In July of 1991, a three-year test allowing television
cameras in eight federal courts was commenced. 30 5 For many years, courts
have utilized videotaped evidence in complex litigation and have become
equipped with electronic equipment. 3°6
As a result of these developments, judges, attorneys, and especially
jurors are now becoming comfortable with the presence of such devices in
modern litigation. 307 As this familiarity broadens, the novelty of placing
recording devices in the jury room will continue to diminish, thereby
curtailing any inappropriate inhibiting effect that such devices might have
upon juries. 308 Given this trend, the time seems nigh to at least begin
considering implementing this procedure in federal and state courts. For
303 See Copen, Courts of the Future, 77 A.B.A.J. 74 (1991) (describing the
modern technology currently being used by state and federal courts).
304 Lippman, We, the (TV) Jury, L.A. Times, June 30, 1991, (Calendar), at 5,
col. 4, at 65, col. 1.
305 Id. at 65; see Heinke, TV in the Courtroom Can Act as Primer on Legal
System, L.A. Times, July 1, 1991, (Calendar), at F3, col. 3-4.
306 See, e.g., Fadely, Use of Computer-Generated Visual Evidence in Aviation
Litigation: Interactive Video Comes to Court, 55 J. AIR L. & CoM. 839 (1990); Figari
& Loewinsohn, Videotaped Depositions Come to Court, 14 LITIG. 35 (1988);
Comment, Videotaped Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: United States v.
Binder, 23 WILLAMEOTE L. REV. 193 (1987).
307 In New York, where since 1987 cameras have been used to record trials as
part of an experimental project, the presence of these devices in the courtroom
appears to have had no adverse impact upon the proceedings. See Crosson, Cameras
in Courts Do Not Adversely Affect Conduct of Court Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., May 1,
1991, at 40. Both New York and New Jersey are now considering measures which
would greatly expand the use of videotaping equipment in many types of trials, either
replacing or supplementing traditional reporting techniques. See id. (discussing New
York developments); Riss, Videotaping Trials is Recommended, N.J.L.J., June 27,
1991, at 1 (discussing New Jersey proposal).
308 Even though the New York experience has disclosed no adverse affects from
using cameras in the courtroom, see Crosson, supra note 307, the risk of behavior
modification in that context seems greater, and more pernicious, than it would be if
recording devices were installed in the jury room. The presence of such equipment in
the courtroom not only threatens to distract the jury's attention from the evidence
being presented (in most cases, the only opportunity they will have to see and hear it),
it also may affect the accuracy of the evidence itself by altering the behavior of the
witnesses.
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courts grappling with the insurance reference dilemma, it may even be an
idea whose time has come.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the insurance exclusionary rule grew out of the post-
industrial litigation boom of the late nineteenth century, it appears that it
still may serve a useful purpose in modem litigation. Contrary to the
protestations of the rule's critics, insurance references still tend to heighten
jurors' awareness of the existence of insurance, and this often influences
their decisionmaking process in a way forbidden under American
jurisprudence. Because the exclusionary rule helps to inhibit this process
by minimizing such references, its retention appears justified, provided it
can be administered in a reasonably efficient fashion. This now appears
possible both during voir dire, by using juror questionnaires, and at trial,
by carefully screening cases before trial for possible insurance issues.
While rigorous application of these devices can reduce the likelihood of
jury indoctrination, it does nothing to reveal if, in fact, such indoctrination
has occurred, or the effect, if any, which it has had upon the deliberations
of the jury. This could be accomplished, however, either through juror
affidavits, post-trial interviews with the jury foreperson, or by recording
the jury's deliberations. By thus eliminating the guesswork currently
necessitated under current practice, these approaches may obviate the need
for the rule itself.
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